Ratings2
Average rating4.5
There's something really clever going on in Appiah's take on ethics in a global world. He goes out of his way to point out that while the main thrust of his positive argument is “you care about X because your neighbour does” is easy to articulate, it's damn hard to get there in most ethical systems.
I don't think this will appeal or even make sense to anyone interested in defining their identity with nations and states. In many ways, Appiah's moral compass only makes sense in a post-colonial context. If you think some accident of your birth entitles you to a special or nobler moral value then he has nothing to offer you. The very point of Appiah's approach to ethics is to first realize that most of the historical precedents that are pointed to for defining moral identities are themeselves mutable. Judgements aren't static. They change over time and they change dramatically when in contact with the wider world.
Why bother reading this? In a political era where nationalism and populism is surprisingly effective, Appiah points out that the purity of moral identities is fiction. This isn't ivory tower philosophy. It's applied ethics that gets the experience of the world from a non-majority point of view–something that's really hard to find articulated so well in any work on ethics.