Babak Fakhamzadeh
A superb overview of the consequences of American intervention in the service of perceived anti-communism since the Second World War. I was not familiar with the insane death toll in Indonesia under Suharto, between half a million and a million deaths, but that is just one of the many truly insane consequences of American hubris. The US has managed to set the world back many, many decades, at a huge cost of human lives, and immense income disparity. Arguably, the US anti-communist, pro-capitalist drive is, as a consequence, responsible for global warming and, perhaps, the ultimate destruction of life as we know it.
Bevins starts at the end of the Second World War, reminding us that the country that emerged as the world’s primary power was a settler colony, entered World War Two as an apartheid state, after, on the American continent, 50 to 70 million indigenous people had been murdered by European settlers.
Then, Bevins points to the 27 million Soviet deaths during the war and, notwithstanding its original obfuscated internal terror, was often ahead in fighting fascism and colonialism (that is, outside of its own internal colonies).
The author continuous, pointing out Stalin’s, and communism’s, influence in Eastern Europe, and the US campaigns to thwart communist politicians particularly in France and Spain.
Further afield, under the anti communist scare in the US, American leaders were seeking allies to counter Soviet influence. In Indonesia, where right wing and communist forces first outed the Dutch, then decimated the communists, the US saw a useful model to replicate elsewhere. But US policies to thwart communism went much further, for example through the recruitment of nazis in Germany, as long as they were anti communist. However, in Europe, fighting communism in Eastern Europe was difficult; in part because the East was well organised, in part because many US operations were compromised from the start, by sympathisers to the communist cause.
After additional missteps, the CIA finally was successful in Iran, removing Mossadegh after he nationalised oil, and in Guatemala, supporting the United Fruit Company when they protested land reforms that would have had far reaching pro-poor consequences, but instead saw thousands executed in the service of capitalism and the United States.
In Indonesia, Sukarno saw a new way forward, based on five principles; belief in god, Justice and civilization, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice. It was in 1955 that Sukarno hosted the Bandung conference, turning Nehru and Sukarno into world leaders and paving the way for the non aligned movement, eventually founded in 1961 in Belgrade. They recognized that their nationalism was not based on race or language, but was rooted in anti-colonial struggle. The Bandung conference closed with ten principles for relations between third world countries, all very much about mutual respect, non intervention, and anti colonialism.
But where the CIA was successful in Iran and Guatemala, they initially failed in Indonesia, if not for lack of trying. Meanwhile, Holland had left much of the country in 1949, by 1958, they were still in control of New Guinea, which was becoming a major issue in Indonesia.
In 1959, Sukarno shifted the country to a different style of inclusive government, which cancelled elections. The Indonesian communists were not in favor, and the army benefited, significantly supported by the US. The Ford foundation started to bring Indonesian students to the US.
JFK was elected in 1960, which initially shifted the American tone towards the developing world in a better direction. It’s striking how, also today, unconventional Kennedy’s views were: “we pledge our best efforts to help [developing countries] help themselves, … not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” But, Kennedy had also inherited the US policy against Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered shortly after Kennedy taking office, as well as the preparations for the massive failure that was the bay of pigs. This was followed by Kennedy, together with brother Bobby, pursuing anti communist actions in Latin America and elsewhere, particularly Cuba receiving their attention. They saw supporting local militaries as practical, including in Indonesia, of course laying the ground for anti democratic forces. Yet, Kennedy also twisted the Dutch arm to finally give up New Guinea in 1961.
Bevins then takes a detour through Brazil, recounting US, particularly Kennedy’s, support for the anti communist forces that lead to the military coup of 1964. Interestingly, and famously, an earlier president, once dictator, Getulio Vargas, committed suïcide by shooting himself, rather then waiting to be deposed, in 1954, oddly paralleling Allende’s ‘suïcide’ two decades later. Vargas, though generally seen as having a positive legacy, was also responsible, in the 1930s, to use a communist-inspired uprising, and a completely fake claimed communist plan, to secure his role as autocrat.
The run up to the 1964 coup has surprising parallels with the political forces at play in Brazil over the last decade. The coup was seen, by the plotters, as ‘democratic’, because they feared the weak president, Jango, could be followed by a stronger, more leftist, even communist, and ‘thus’ anti-democratic, president, justifying an intervention to ‘save’ democracy. Leftist protests, when the vote was still restricted and based on literacy, were countered by us-supported right-Christian counter protests, along lines identical to today’s divisions between Bolsonaro and PT supporters. After the coup, the US ambassador commented on the event: “the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century.”
Meanwhile, Sukarno was opposed to the UK’s plans for Malaysia, constructing a country that purposefully restricted the influence of the left. Under Kennedy, this could have been resolved, but after his assassination, Johnson shifted his focus to the Brits, supporting their vision in return for their support on Vietnam. Then, on September 30, 1965, botched action from lesser military commanders, perhaps as a consequence of American propaganda, escalated in to military leaders being killed, and Army general Suharto, supposedly opposing those actions, taking over. Sukarno was still technically president, but actual control, based on lies and international support of those lies, shifted quickly to Suharto. On Bali alone, 80000 were murdered. In the country, half a million to a million were killed, an additional 1 million were put in concentration camps. Throughout, the US had fully aided and abetted Sukarno’s actions.
What followed was a structural destruction of leftist forces in multiple countries in the global south, all facilitated or directed by, mostly, the United States. And, in Latin America, also by Brazil.
By the early seventies, in Latin American right wing circles, including military contexts, the ‘Jakarta plan’ was describing the intention of mass killing leftist activists, thinkers, and politicians, in order to secure a right wing coup or government. For one, Chile, where graffiti promising ‘Jakarta’ was plastered on its walls, delivered on this, Pinochet murdering thousands on the left.
Deathly anti-communist interventions escalated in Latin America, more so during Reagan’s tenure. When Portugal let go of its colonies, Suharto ended up murdering a third of the East Timor population, while the US considered inviting Portugal if the country was going to shift too much to the left. The number of victims of US backed violence in Latin America, between 1960 and 1990, vastly exceeded the number of people killed in the Soviet union and eastern bloc over the same time period.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the US didn’t tone down its pursuit of hegemony. Opposition faltered, but the pursuit of empire continued.
The real kick of the book is in the final chapter. Bevins relates the questions he put to those prosecuted by Suharto, and others: “think back to 1963. What world did you believe you were building? What did you believe the world would be like in the 21st century?” And then: “Is that the world you live in, now?”
Interestingly, of those interviewed, most were non violent back in the day, but now had to admit that, in the face of violent onslaught, the only chance at survival would have been armed resistance.
A superb overview of the consequences of American intervention in the service of perceived anti-communism since the Second World War. I was not familiar with the insane death toll in Indonesia under Suharto, between half a million and a million deaths, but that is just one of the many truly insane consequences of American hubris. The US has managed to set the world back many, many decades, at a huge cost of human lives, and immense income disparity. Arguably, the US anti-communist, pro-capitalist drive is, as a consequence, responsible for global warming and, perhaps, the ultimate destruction of life as we know it.
Bevins starts at the end of the Second World War, reminding us that the country that emerged as the world’s primary power was a settler colony, entered World War Two as an apartheid state, after, on the American continent, 50 to 70 million indigenous people had been murdered by European settlers.
Then, Bevins points to the 27 million Soviet deaths during the war and, notwithstanding its original obfuscated internal terror, was often ahead in fighting fascism and colonialism (that is, outside of its own internal colonies).
The author continuous, pointing out Stalin’s, and communism’s, influence in Eastern Europe, and the US campaigns to thwart communist politicians particularly in France and Spain.
Further afield, under the anti communist scare in the US, American leaders were seeking allies to counter Soviet influence. In Indonesia, where right wing and communist forces first outed the Dutch, then decimated the communists, the US saw a useful model to replicate elsewhere. But US policies to thwart communism went much further, for example through the recruitment of nazis in Germany, as long as they were anti communist. However, in Europe, fighting communism in Eastern Europe was difficult; in part because the East was well organised, in part because many US operations were compromised from the start, by sympathisers to the communist cause.
After additional missteps, the CIA finally was successful in Iran, removing Mossadegh after he nationalised oil, and in Guatemala, supporting the United Fruit Company when they protested land reforms that would have had far reaching pro-poor consequences, but instead saw thousands executed in the service of capitalism and the United States.
In Indonesia, Sukarno saw a new way forward, based on five principles; belief in god, Justice and civilization, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice. It was in 1955 that Sukarno hosted the Bandung conference, turning Nehru and Sukarno into world leaders and paving the way for the non aligned movement, eventually founded in 1961 in Belgrade. They recognized that their nationalism was not based on race or language, but was rooted in anti-colonial struggle. The Bandung conference closed with ten principles for relations between third world countries, all very much about mutual respect, non intervention, and anti colonialism.
But where the CIA was successful in Iran and Guatemala, they initially failed in Indonesia, if not for lack of trying. Meanwhile, Holland had left much of the country in 1949, by 1958, they were still in control of New Guinea, which was becoming a major issue in Indonesia.
In 1959, Sukarno shifted the country to a different style of inclusive government, which cancelled elections. The Indonesian communists were not in favor, and the army benefited, significantly supported by the US. The Ford foundation started to bring Indonesian students to the US.
JFK was elected in 1960, which initially shifted the American tone towards the developing world in a better direction. It’s striking how, also today, unconventional Kennedy’s views were: “we pledge our best efforts to help [developing countries] help themselves, … not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” But, Kennedy had also inherited the US policy against Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered shortly after Kennedy taking office, as well as the preparations for the massive failure that was the bay of pigs. This was followed by Kennedy, together with brother Bobby, pursuing anti communist actions in Latin America and elsewhere, particularly Cuba receiving their attention. They saw supporting local militaries as practical, including in Indonesia, of course laying the ground for anti democratic forces. Yet, Kennedy also twisted the Dutch arm to finally give up New Guinea in 1961.
Bevins then takes a detour through Brazil, recounting US, particularly Kennedy’s, support for the anti communist forces that lead to the military coup of 1964. Interestingly, and famously, an earlier president, once dictator, Getulio Vargas, committed suïcide by shooting himself, rather then waiting to be deposed, in 1954, oddly paralleling Allende’s ‘suïcide’ two decades later. Vargas, though generally seen as having a positive legacy, was also responsible, in the 1930s, to use a communist-inspired uprising, and a completely fake claimed communist plan, to secure his role as autocrat.
The run up to the 1964 coup has surprising parallels with the political forces at play in Brazil over the last decade. The coup was seen, by the plotters, as ‘democratic’, because they feared the weak president, Jango, could be followed by a stronger, more leftist, even communist, and ‘thus’ anti-democratic, president, justifying an intervention to ‘save’ democracy. Leftist protests, when the vote was still restricted and based on literacy, were countered by us-supported right-Christian counter protests, along lines identical to today’s divisions between Bolsonaro and PT supporters. After the coup, the US ambassador commented on the event: “the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century.”
Meanwhile, Sukarno was opposed to the UK’s plans for Malaysia, constructing a country that purposefully restricted the influence of the left. Under Kennedy, this could have been resolved, but after his assassination, Johnson shifted his focus to the Brits, supporting their vision in return for their support on Vietnam. Then, on September 30, 1965, botched action from lesser military commanders, perhaps as a consequence of American propaganda, escalated in to military leaders being killed, and Army general Suharto, supposedly opposing those actions, taking over. Sukarno was still technically president, but actual control, based on lies and international support of those lies, shifted quickly to Suharto. On Bali alone, 80000 were murdered. In the country, half a million to a million were killed, an additional 1 million were put in concentration camps. Throughout, the US had fully aided and abetted Sukarno’s actions.
What followed was a structural destruction of leftist forces in multiple countries in the global south, all facilitated or directed by, mostly, the United States. And, in Latin America, also by Brazil.
By the early seventies, in Latin American right wing circles, including military contexts, the ‘Jakarta plan’ was describing the intention of mass killing leftist activists, thinkers, and politicians, in order to secure a right wing coup or government. For one, Chile, where graffiti promising ‘Jakarta’ was plastered on its walls, delivered on this, Pinochet murdering thousands on the left.
Deathly anti-communist interventions escalated in Latin America, more so during Reagan’s tenure. When Portugal let go of its colonies, Suharto ended up murdering a third of the East Timor population, while the US considered inviting Portugal if the country was going to shift too much to the left. The number of victims of US backed violence in Latin America, between 1960 and 1990, vastly exceeded the number of people killed in the Soviet union and eastern bloc over the same time period.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the US didn’t tone down its pursuit of hegemony. Opposition faltered, but the pursuit of empire continued.
The real kick of the book is in the final chapter. Bevins relates the questions he put to those prosecuted by Suharto, and others: “think back to 1963. What world did you believe you were building? What did you believe the world would be like in the 21st century?” And then: “Is that the world you live in, now?”
Interestingly, of those interviewed, most were non violent back in the day, but now had to admit that, in the face of violent onslaught, the only chance at survival would have been armed resistance.