Babak Fakhamzadeh
Utterly fascinating. The author, writing decades after his experience of having been captured by Austrians during the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Austria in the late 17th century, is interestingly detached from the events he describes. Effectively being a slave for some 12 years, and having been treated, at times, horribly, this appears to suggest impressively having come to terms with his experiences and those who treated him so badly. Doubly fascinating that Osman of Timisoara entered a life of diplomacy on behalf of the Ottoman Sultanate, traveling back to Austria, and having to interact with some of the exact same individuals he served under while under Austrian control.
Mostly as a backdrop, the ethnic and cultural mix of the greater Balkans, regions switching between Ottoman and Austrian control on a regular basis, adds to the fascination the region provides.
Utterly fascinating. The author, writing decades after his experience of having been captured by Austrians during the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Austria in the late 17th century, is interestingly detached from the events he describes. Effectively being a slave for some 12 years, and having been treated, at times, horribly, this appears to suggest impressively having come to terms with his experiences and those who treated him so badly. Doubly fascinating that Osman of Timisoara entered a life of diplomacy on behalf of the Ottoman Sultanate, traveling back to Austria, and having to interact with some of the exact same individuals he served under while under Austrian control.
Mostly as a backdrop, the ethnic and cultural mix of the greater Balkans, regions switching between Ottoman and Austrian control on a regular basis, adds to the fascination the region provides.
Enjoyable, and good to finally read what stood at the basis of the film Stalker. Fascinating, and a good read, but with a few rough patches.
Enjoyable, and good to finally read what stood at the basis of the film Stalker. Fascinating, and a good read, but with a few rough patches.
Easy read, entertaining, sweet.
Easy read, entertaining, sweet.
Though Sharman apologizes for the book being a tad thin, the continuous repetition of the same argument makes the narrative a bit of a slog.
The central point of the book is that the general consensus that the West, particularly Western Europe, dominated the rest of the world from the early modern period onwards (roughly from the beginning of the age of colonialism) due to a synergy between more centralised and efficient state control on one side, and more efficient and ever bigger armies on the other, is wrong.
Colonial powers ruled the seas, because those in what would become the colonies didn't much care for the seas, while the colonisers only started to control inland territories after the Napoleonic wars, mostly for reasons that had little to do with military strength, more with local powers slowly disintegrating. Until then, across the board, local polities tended to be more powerful, often significantly so, compared to the new arrivals.
Where this didn't apply, mostly the Americas, it was disease and, as elsewhere, being able to play off competing factions against each other, which allowed colonial powers to take control of land.
Sharman's deconstruction continues. The military innovations of Europe did not get exported to the colonies, where they fought with minute armies, mostly conscripted and mercenaries, mostly privately run. And, even in Europe and the shores of North Africa, European armies couldn't compete with non-European attackers. Only by 1683 were the Ottomans prevented from continuing their inroads into Europe, at the gates of Vienna, and it took until the 18th century before Russia won a series of decisive battles against the Ottomans. But there, too, due to political shifts within the Ottoman Empire, not due to military supremacy of Europe.
Even as early as 1578, the Portuguese decisively lost a large battle in Morocco, resulting in the death of the Portuguese King, which in turn resulted in Spain claiming control of Portugal, and the Iberian Union, which in turn triggered Holland, itself fighting Spanish colonial control, to attempt to take Brazil from Spain.
Pleasantly, Sharman mentions the genocide of the people of the Banda islands by the Dutchman Coen, in the service of securing nutmeg, going on to clarify that, at that time, nutmeg was considered to ward off the plague, and that in the trade of new Amsterdam and Suriname, the Dutch also received the tiny island of Run, the only English-held nutmeg producing island.
In the end, the author points out that the false claim he addresses is in large part a consequence of bias of place, eurocentrism, and bias of time, projecting backwards the European successes of the 19th century. And that this, in turn, is a matter of conveniently cutting off this European-centric view at the beginning of the 20th century, considering the subsequent losses of western hegemony after the Second World War.
Though Sharman apologizes for the book being a tad thin, the continuous repetition of the same argument makes the narrative a bit of a slog.
The central point of the book is that the general consensus that the West, particularly Western Europe, dominated the rest of the world from the early modern period onwards (roughly from the beginning of the age of colonialism) due to a synergy between more centralised and efficient state control on one side, and more efficient and ever bigger armies on the other, is wrong.
Colonial powers ruled the seas, because those in what would become the colonies didn't much care for the seas, while the colonisers only started to control inland territories after the Napoleonic wars, mostly for reasons that had little to do with military strength, more with local powers slowly disintegrating. Until then, across the board, local polities tended to be more powerful, often significantly so, compared to the new arrivals.
Where this didn't apply, mostly the Americas, it was disease and, as elsewhere, being able to play off competing factions against each other, which allowed colonial powers to take control of land.
Sharman's deconstruction continues. The military innovations of Europe did not get exported to the colonies, where they fought with minute armies, mostly conscripted and mercenaries, mostly privately run. And, even in Europe and the shores of North Africa, European armies couldn't compete with non-European attackers. Only by 1683 were the Ottomans prevented from continuing their inroads into Europe, at the gates of Vienna, and it took until the 18th century before Russia won a series of decisive battles against the Ottomans. But there, too, due to political shifts within the Ottoman Empire, not due to military supremacy of Europe.
Even as early as 1578, the Portuguese decisively lost a large battle in Morocco, resulting in the death of the Portuguese King, which in turn resulted in Spain claiming control of Portugal, and the Iberian Union, which in turn triggered Holland, itself fighting Spanish colonial control, to attempt to take Brazil from Spain.
Pleasantly, Sharman mentions the genocide of the people of the Banda islands by the Dutchman Coen, in the service of securing nutmeg, going on to clarify that, at that time, nutmeg was considered to ward off the plague, and that in the trade of new Amsterdam and Suriname, the Dutch also received the tiny island of Run, the only English-held nutmeg producing island.
In the end, the author points out that the false claim he addresses is in large part a consequence of bias of place, eurocentrism, and bias of time, projecting backwards the European successes of the 19th century. And that this, in turn, is a matter of conveniently cutting off this European-centric view at the beginning of the 20th century, considering the subsequent losses of western hegemony after the Second World War.
A superb overview of the consequences of American intervention in the service of perceived anti-communism since the Second World War. I was not familiar with the insane death toll in Indonesia under Suharto, between half a million and a million deaths, but that is just one of the many truly insane consequences of American hubris. The US has managed to set the world back many, many decades, at a huge cost of human lives, and immense income disparity. Arguably, the US anti-communist, pro-capitalist drive is, as a consequence, responsible for global warming and, perhaps, the ultimate destruction of life as we know it.
Bevins starts at the end of the Second World War, reminding us that the country that emerged as the world’s primary power was a settler colony, entered World War Two as an apartheid state, after, on the American continent, 50 to 70 million indigenous people had been murdered by European settlers.
Then, Bevins points to the 27 million Soviet deaths during the war and, notwithstanding its original obfuscated internal terror, was often ahead in fighting fascism and colonialism (that is, outside of its own internal colonies).
The author continuous, pointing out Stalin’s, and communism’s, influence in Eastern Europe, and the US campaigns to thwart communist politicians particularly in France and Spain.
Further afield, under the anti communist scare in the US, American leaders were seeking allies to counter Soviet influence. In Indonesia, where right wing and communist forces first outed the Dutch, then decimated the communists, the US saw a useful model to replicate elsewhere. But US policies to thwart communism went much further, for example through the recruitment of nazis in Germany, as long as they were anti communist. However, in Europe, fighting communism in Eastern Europe was difficult; in part because the East was well organised, in part because many US operations were compromised from the start, by sympathisers to the communist cause.
After additional missteps, the CIA finally was successful in Iran, removing Mossadegh after he nationalised oil, and in Guatemala, supporting the United Fruit Company when they protested land reforms that would have had far reaching pro-poor consequences, but instead saw thousands executed in the service of capitalism and the United States.
In Indonesia, Sukarno saw a new way forward, based on five principles; belief in god, Justice and civilization, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice. It was in 1955 that Sukarno hosted the Bandung conference, turning Nehru and Sukarno into world leaders and paving the way for the non aligned movement, eventually founded in 1961 in Belgrade. They recognized that their nationalism was not based on race or language, but was rooted in anti-colonial struggle. The Bandung conference closed with ten principles for relations between third world countries, all very much about mutual respect, non intervention, and anti colonialism.
But where the CIA was successful in Iran and Guatemala, they initially failed in Indonesia, if not for lack of trying. Meanwhile, Holland had left much of the country in 1949, by 1958, they were still in control of New Guinea, which was becoming a major issue in Indonesia.
In 1959, Sukarno shifted the country to a different style of inclusive government, which cancelled elections. The Indonesian communists were not in favor, and the army benefited, significantly supported by the US. The Ford foundation started to bring Indonesian students to the US.
JFK was elected in 1960, which initially shifted the American tone towards the developing world in a better direction. It’s striking how, also today, unconventional Kennedy’s views were: “we pledge our best efforts to help [developing countries] help themselves, … not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” But, Kennedy had also inherited the US policy against Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered shortly after Kennedy taking office, as well as the preparations for the massive failure that was the bay of pigs. This was followed by Kennedy, together with brother Bobby, pursuing anti communist actions in Latin America and elsewhere, particularly Cuba receiving their attention. They saw supporting local militaries as practical, including in Indonesia, of course laying the ground for anti democratic forces. Yet, Kennedy also twisted the Dutch arm to finally give up New Guinea in 1961.
Bevins then takes a detour through Brazil, recounting US, particularly Kennedy’s, support for the anti communist forces that lead to the military coup of 1964. Interestingly, and famously, an earlier president, once dictator, Getulio Vargas, committed suïcide by shooting himself, rather then waiting to be deposed, in 1954, oddly paralleling Allende’s ‘suïcide’ two decades later. Vargas, though generally seen as having a positive legacy, was also responsible, in the 1930s, to use a communist-inspired uprising, and a completely fake claimed communist plan, to secure his role as autocrat.
The run up to the 1964 coup has surprising parallels with the political forces at play in Brazil over the last decade. The coup was seen, by the plotters, as ‘democratic’, because they feared the weak president, Jango, could be followed by a stronger, more leftist, even communist, and ‘thus’ anti-democratic, president, justifying an intervention to ‘save’ democracy. Leftist protests, when the vote was still restricted and based on literacy, were countered by us-supported right-Christian counter protests, along lines identical to today’s divisions between Bolsonaro and PT supporters. After the coup, the US ambassador commented on the event: “the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century.”
Meanwhile, Sukarno was opposed to the UK’s plans for Malaysia, constructing a country that purposefully restricted the influence of the left. Under Kennedy, this could have been resolved, but after his assassination, Johnson shifted his focus to the Brits, supporting their vision in return for their support on Vietnam. Then, on September 30, 1965, botched action from lesser military commanders, perhaps as a consequence of American propaganda, escalated in to military leaders being killed, and Army general Suharto, supposedly opposing those actions, taking over. Sukarno was still technically president, but actual control, based on lies and international support of those lies, shifted quickly to Suharto. On Bali alone, 80000 were murdered. In the country, half a million to a million were killed, an additional 1 million were put in concentration camps. Throughout, the US had fully aided and abetted Sukarno’s actions.
What followed was a structural destruction of leftist forces in multiple countries in the global south, all facilitated or directed by, mostly, the United States. And, in Latin America, also by Brazil.
By the early seventies, in Latin American right wing circles, including military contexts, the ‘Jakarta plan’ was describing the intention of mass killing leftist activists, thinkers, and politicians, in order to secure a right wing coup or government. For one, Chile, where graffiti promising ‘Jakarta’ was plastered on its walls, delivered on this, Pinochet murdering thousands on the left.
Deathly anti-communist interventions escalated in Latin America, more so during Reagan’s tenure. When Portugal let go of its colonies, Suharto ended up murdering a third of the East Timor population, while the US considered inviting Portugal if the country was going to shift too much to the left. The number of victims of US backed violence in Latin America, between 1960 and 1990, vastly exceeded the number of people killed in the Soviet union and eastern bloc over the same time period.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the US didn’t tone down its pursuit of hegemony. Opposition faltered, but the pursuit of empire continued.
The real kick of the book is in the final chapter. Bevins relates the questions he put to those prosecuted by Suharto, and others: “think back to 1963. What world did you believe you were building? What did you believe the world would be like in the 21st century?” And then: “Is that the world you live in, now?”
Interestingly, of those interviewed, most were non violent back in the day, but now had to admit that, in the face of violent onslaught, the only chance at survival would have been armed resistance.
A superb overview of the consequences of American intervention in the service of perceived anti-communism since the Second World War. I was not familiar with the insane death toll in Indonesia under Suharto, between half a million and a million deaths, but that is just one of the many truly insane consequences of American hubris. The US has managed to set the world back many, many decades, at a huge cost of human lives, and immense income disparity. Arguably, the US anti-communist, pro-capitalist drive is, as a consequence, responsible for global warming and, perhaps, the ultimate destruction of life as we know it.
Bevins starts at the end of the Second World War, reminding us that the country that emerged as the world’s primary power was a settler colony, entered World War Two as an apartheid state, after, on the American continent, 50 to 70 million indigenous people had been murdered by European settlers.
Then, Bevins points to the 27 million Soviet deaths during the war and, notwithstanding its original obfuscated internal terror, was often ahead in fighting fascism and colonialism (that is, outside of its own internal colonies).
The author continuous, pointing out Stalin’s, and communism’s, influence in Eastern Europe, and the US campaigns to thwart communist politicians particularly in France and Spain.
Further afield, under the anti communist scare in the US, American leaders were seeking allies to counter Soviet influence. In Indonesia, where right wing and communist forces first outed the Dutch, then decimated the communists, the US saw a useful model to replicate elsewhere. But US policies to thwart communism went much further, for example through the recruitment of nazis in Germany, as long as they were anti communist. However, in Europe, fighting communism in Eastern Europe was difficult; in part because the East was well organised, in part because many US operations were compromised from the start, by sympathisers to the communist cause.
After additional missteps, the CIA finally was successful in Iran, removing Mossadegh after he nationalised oil, and in Guatemala, supporting the United Fruit Company when they protested land reforms that would have had far reaching pro-poor consequences, but instead saw thousands executed in the service of capitalism and the United States.
In Indonesia, Sukarno saw a new way forward, based on five principles; belief in god, Justice and civilization, Indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice. It was in 1955 that Sukarno hosted the Bandung conference, turning Nehru and Sukarno into world leaders and paving the way for the non aligned movement, eventually founded in 1961 in Belgrade. They recognized that their nationalism was not based on race or language, but was rooted in anti-colonial struggle. The Bandung conference closed with ten principles for relations between third world countries, all very much about mutual respect, non intervention, and anti colonialism.
But where the CIA was successful in Iran and Guatemala, they initially failed in Indonesia, if not for lack of trying. Meanwhile, Holland had left much of the country in 1949, by 1958, they were still in control of New Guinea, which was becoming a major issue in Indonesia.
In 1959, Sukarno shifted the country to a different style of inclusive government, which cancelled elections. The Indonesian communists were not in favor, and the army benefited, significantly supported by the US. The Ford foundation started to bring Indonesian students to the US.
JFK was elected in 1960, which initially shifted the American tone towards the developing world in a better direction. It’s striking how, also today, unconventional Kennedy’s views were: “we pledge our best efforts to help [developing countries] help themselves, … not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” But, Kennedy had also inherited the US policy against Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered shortly after Kennedy taking office, as well as the preparations for the massive failure that was the bay of pigs. This was followed by Kennedy, together with brother Bobby, pursuing anti communist actions in Latin America and elsewhere, particularly Cuba receiving their attention. They saw supporting local militaries as practical, including in Indonesia, of course laying the ground for anti democratic forces. Yet, Kennedy also twisted the Dutch arm to finally give up New Guinea in 1961.
Bevins then takes a detour through Brazil, recounting US, particularly Kennedy’s, support for the anti communist forces that lead to the military coup of 1964. Interestingly, and famously, an earlier president, once dictator, Getulio Vargas, committed suïcide by shooting himself, rather then waiting to be deposed, in 1954, oddly paralleling Allende’s ‘suïcide’ two decades later. Vargas, though generally seen as having a positive legacy, was also responsible, in the 1930s, to use a communist-inspired uprising, and a completely fake claimed communist plan, to secure his role as autocrat.
The run up to the 1964 coup has surprising parallels with the political forces at play in Brazil over the last decade. The coup was seen, by the plotters, as ‘democratic’, because they feared the weak president, Jango, could be followed by a stronger, more leftist, even communist, and ‘thus’ anti-democratic, president, justifying an intervention to ‘save’ democracy. Leftist protests, when the vote was still restricted and based on literacy, were countered by us-supported right-Christian counter protests, along lines identical to today’s divisions between Bolsonaro and PT supporters. After the coup, the US ambassador commented on the event: “the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century.”
Meanwhile, Sukarno was opposed to the UK’s plans for Malaysia, constructing a country that purposefully restricted the influence of the left. Under Kennedy, this could have been resolved, but after his assassination, Johnson shifted his focus to the Brits, supporting their vision in return for their support on Vietnam. Then, on September 30, 1965, botched action from lesser military commanders, perhaps as a consequence of American propaganda, escalated in to military leaders being killed, and Army general Suharto, supposedly opposing those actions, taking over. Sukarno was still technically president, but actual control, based on lies and international support of those lies, shifted quickly to Suharto. On Bali alone, 80000 were murdered. In the country, half a million to a million were killed, an additional 1 million were put in concentration camps. Throughout, the US had fully aided and abetted Sukarno’s actions.
What followed was a structural destruction of leftist forces in multiple countries in the global south, all facilitated or directed by, mostly, the United States. And, in Latin America, also by Brazil.
By the early seventies, in Latin American right wing circles, including military contexts, the ‘Jakarta plan’ was describing the intention of mass killing leftist activists, thinkers, and politicians, in order to secure a right wing coup or government. For one, Chile, where graffiti promising ‘Jakarta’ was plastered on its walls, delivered on this, Pinochet murdering thousands on the left.
Deathly anti-communist interventions escalated in Latin America, more so during Reagan’s tenure. When Portugal let go of its colonies, Suharto ended up murdering a third of the East Timor population, while the US considered inviting Portugal if the country was going to shift too much to the left. The number of victims of US backed violence in Latin America, between 1960 and 1990, vastly exceeded the number of people killed in the Soviet union and eastern bloc over the same time period.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the US didn’t tone down its pursuit of hegemony. Opposition faltered, but the pursuit of empire continued.
The real kick of the book is in the final chapter. Bevins relates the questions he put to those prosecuted by Suharto, and others: “think back to 1963. What world did you believe you were building? What did you believe the world would be like in the 21st century?” And then: “Is that the world you live in, now?”
Interestingly, of those interviewed, most were non violent back in the day, but now had to admit that, in the face of violent onslaught, the only chance at survival would have been armed resistance.
Excellent biographical account of Waldemar Nods, a colored man from Suriname who became romantically involved with a Dutch divorcee in The Hague, around 1930. The end of the story, though true, is incredible.
Waldemar’s father, Koos, had been an adventurer, black, though perhaps from a jewish father, but born free after the abolishment of slavery. Financially successful, but never one to sit still, he moved to Brazil, leaving Waldemar’s mother behind in Paramaribo. According to the author, Koos ended up as mayor of Ouro Petro, in Minas Gerais, but the list of mayors of Ouro Preto on Wikipedia does not mention the man.
Excellent biographical account of Waldemar Nods, a colored man from Suriname who became romantically involved with a Dutch divorcee in The Hague, around 1930. The end of the story, though true, is incredible.
Waldemar’s father, Koos, had been an adventurer, black, though perhaps from a jewish father, but born free after the abolishment of slavery. Financially successful, but never one to sit still, he moved to Brazil, leaving Waldemar’s mother behind in Paramaribo. According to the author, Koos ended up as mayor of Ouro Petro, in Minas Gerais, but the list of mayors of Ouro Preto on Wikipedia does not mention the man.
Good prose, but the plot twists this story depends on feel too contrived.
Good prose, but the plot twists this story depends on feel too contrived.
Starts a bit slow, but is mostly funny, and has a pretty good second half.
Starts a bit slow, but is mostly funny, and has a pretty good second half.
Electronic Gods
Has potential, conceptually, but fails to address so many plot holes, that the story becomes tedious, lacking the internal consistency it needs to suspend disbelief.
In the end, the book's like an experimental science fiction film based on interesting concepts, but with a weak execution.
Has potential, conceptually, but fails to address so many plot holes, that the story becomes tedious, lacking the internal consistency it needs to suspend disbelief.
In the end, the book's like an experimental science fiction film based on interesting concepts, but with a weak execution.
Amrith constructs a gorgeous impression of the shores and history of the Bay of Bengal, roughly along a chronological path. Fascinating for its rich histories, he leaves the reader with a thorough insight in the complex markup of the region, his story meandering from topic to topic, from location to location, from personal history to personal history.
Except for the Bay itself, Amrith’s history doesn’t really have a central focus, or theme, meaning that the book is really a, well told, whirlwind of over 500 years of history, spanning all countries along the shores of the Bay of Bengal, though perhaps with a somewhat stronger focus on Tamil migrations along its shores. Though, a broad range of influences get a mention, including Yemenite traders, and Mozambican slaves that the Brits at some point imported to Indonesia.
A few interesting remarks from throughout the book:
+ The rise and decline of the Bay of Bengal as a region parallels the rise and collapse of British imperialism in Asia.
+ Bangladesh *is* the Himalayas, flattened out.
+ The [Dutch] saw themselves as different from the swashbuckling Portuguese: more ordered, more rational, more enlightened. But [these] European powers had much in common; they came for Asia’s wealth in spices and textiles, they shared their dependence on inter-Asian trade, they struggled to balance their public and private interests. But, the Dutch brand of capitalism was the stronger, and more successful one. If, eventually, the Brits prevailed. And, the English were the most effective of all at combining moralism and self-interest.
+ A throwaway remark that warrants investigation: “everywhere [Muharram] was a major public celebration, and that seemed to upend the prevailing social order”. Was this celebrated as a kind of carnival?
+ The author claims that modern laws around migration, legal and illegal, were given shape at the start of the 20th century, in cases involving forced, and unforced, migration in and around the Bay of Bengal.
+ Part of One chapter is dedicated to the cosmopolitanism of Burma at the start of the 20th century. Exemplary for how tides can turn.
Near the end, Amrith argues that nationalism in and around the Bay, in the 1930s and 1940s, dovetailed with the invasion of Japan, and several successive waves of independence, with the drying up of the historical cycles of migrations around the bay, as a consequence, diminishing trade and travel. This was followed by decades of reverse migrations, where a number of countries strove for stronger ethnic unity, at the cost of denying long-term, not first-generation, migrants citizenship, or even requiring them to return to their countries of ‘origin’.
Amrith constructs a gorgeous impression of the shores and history of the Bay of Bengal, roughly along a chronological path. Fascinating for its rich histories, he leaves the reader with a thorough insight in the complex markup of the region, his story meandering from topic to topic, from location to location, from personal history to personal history.
Except for the Bay itself, Amrith’s history doesn’t really have a central focus, or theme, meaning that the book is really a, well told, whirlwind of over 500 years of history, spanning all countries along the shores of the Bay of Bengal, though perhaps with a somewhat stronger focus on Tamil migrations along its shores. Though, a broad range of influences get a mention, including Yemenite traders, and Mozambican slaves that the Brits at some point imported to Indonesia.
A few interesting remarks from throughout the book:
+ The rise and decline of the Bay of Bengal as a region parallels the rise and collapse of British imperialism in Asia.
+ Bangladesh *is* the Himalayas, flattened out.
+ The [Dutch] saw themselves as different from the swashbuckling Portuguese: more ordered, more rational, more enlightened. But [these] European powers had much in common; they came for Asia’s wealth in spices and textiles, they shared their dependence on inter-Asian trade, they struggled to balance their public and private interests. But, the Dutch brand of capitalism was the stronger, and more successful one. If, eventually, the Brits prevailed. And, the English were the most effective of all at combining moralism and self-interest.
+ A throwaway remark that warrants investigation: “everywhere [Muharram] was a major public celebration, and that seemed to upend the prevailing social order”. Was this celebrated as a kind of carnival?
+ The author claims that modern laws around migration, legal and illegal, were given shape at the start of the 20th century, in cases involving forced, and unforced, migration in and around the Bay of Bengal.
+ Part of One chapter is dedicated to the cosmopolitanism of Burma at the start of the 20th century. Exemplary for how tides can turn.
Near the end, Amrith argues that nationalism in and around the Bay, in the 1930s and 1940s, dovetailed with the invasion of Japan, and several successive waves of independence, with the drying up of the historical cycles of migrations around the bay, as a consequence, diminishing trade and travel. This was followed by decades of reverse migrations, where a number of countries strove for stronger ethnic unity, at the cost of denying long-term, not first-generation, migrants citizenship, or even requiring them to return to their countries of ‘origin’.
In the introduction, Eisner, the biographer, takes care of perhaps the biggest questions; the drug case against Noriega, for which he was convicted, was deeply flawed and wholly circumstantial; the US invasion was unjustified on legal, political and moral grounds.
Noriega's memoires, the bulk of the book, are interesting as far as they go, just; descriptive, less so analytical. They make a clear point: the US invaded because they stood to lose control over the canal, after Panama had secured the Torrijos-Carter treaty and was shifting focus on working with Japan to expand the canal. And, because Panama declined to kowtow (enough) to the US in their covert operations in Central America. On the downside, Noriega tries a bit too hard to prove the US was the only bad actor, making it appear as if he and his former boss Torrijos always and alone acted in good faith.
Eisner, in his afterword, starts of by reiterating the same points he made in the introduction; Noriega was not guilty of the charges against him, the invasion was not justified. He elaborates, and makes an easy case for what should now be widely known (the book was published in 1998); the US' constant and very extensive high level control of, what should be independent, countries in the Americas.
In the introduction, Eisner, the biographer, takes care of perhaps the biggest questions; the drug case against Noriega, for which he was convicted, was deeply flawed and wholly circumstantial; the US invasion was unjustified on legal, political and moral grounds.
Noriega's memoires, the bulk of the book, are interesting as far as they go, just; descriptive, less so analytical. They make a clear point: the US invaded because they stood to lose control over the canal, after Panama had secured the Torrijos-Carter treaty and was shifting focus on working with Japan to expand the canal. And, because Panama declined to kowtow (enough) to the US in their covert operations in Central America. On the downside, Noriega tries a bit too hard to prove the US was the only bad actor, making it appear as if he and his former boss Torrijos always and alone acted in good faith.
Eisner, in his afterword, starts of by reiterating the same points he made in the introduction; Noriega was not guilty of the charges against him, the invasion was not justified. He elaborates, and makes an easy case for what should now be widely known (the book was published in 1998); the US' constant and very extensive high level control of, what should be independent, countries in the Americas.
Feiling spends a lot of pages on trying to explain the history of the conflicts Colombia has had to deal with over the past few decades, specifically the interplay between army, FARC and militias. Now, with the peace talks between FARC and the government having come to fruition (after a public vote rejected a deal earlier this year, a new deal was agreed on that didn't need a public vote), this takes up too much space and this four year old book already feels outdated.
Here are a few interesting tidbits:
+ Simon Bolivar considered making Colombia an English speaking country after independence. He was dissuaded by his second in command. + Colombia's rivers and lakes contain more freshwater than those of the US and Canada, combined. + Avianca is the second oldest operating airline in the world (KLM is just two months older). + Feiling suggests the Guane were a white tribe that did not arrive from Asia, but there seems to be little evidence of that, besides that they did seem to have been more European in their appearance. + Colombia has the largest coal mine in Latin America.
At some point, Feiling agitates against the modern backpacker, a troupe of which he encounters when hiking with a Colombian friend. He wonders about their disconnect with the 'real' Colombia while being continuously connected with their Facebook friends and this particular strata of information that includes knowing how to bridge the Darien gap and which hostel to stay at in Nepal. In short, the author likes to point out he is experiencing the real Colombia. But, he also suggests that these latter day tourists look for a mix of three things; the classical Grand Tour, with the objective of 'toughening up' by experiencing foreign cultures, the post 1960s version of the Grand Tour with the objective of loosening up, and the typical holiday maker, wanting to leave the cares of the world behind. To me, this analysis seems spot on, though the author seems to miss that he's just one of them, with slightly different weights attached to these three portions. Or not. Just a few pages later, he admits to joining them in their activities.
Feiling spends a lot of pages on trying to explain the history of the conflicts Colombia has had to deal with over the past few decades, specifically the interplay between army, FARC and militias. Now, with the peace talks between FARC and the government having come to fruition (after a public vote rejected a deal earlier this year, a new deal was agreed on that didn't need a public vote), this takes up too much space and this four year old book already feels outdated.
Here are a few interesting tidbits:
+ Simon Bolivar considered making Colombia an English speaking country after independence. He was dissuaded by his second in command. + Colombia's rivers and lakes contain more freshwater than those of the US and Canada, combined. + Avianca is the second oldest operating airline in the world (KLM is just two months older). + Feiling suggests the Guane were a white tribe that did not arrive from Asia, but there seems to be little evidence of that, besides that they did seem to have been more European in their appearance. + Colombia has the largest coal mine in Latin America.
At some point, Feiling agitates against the modern backpacker, a troupe of which he encounters when hiking with a Colombian friend. He wonders about their disconnect with the 'real' Colombia while being continuously connected with their Facebook friends and this particular strata of information that includes knowing how to bridge the Darien gap and which hostel to stay at in Nepal. In short, the author likes to point out he is experiencing the real Colombia. But, he also suggests that these latter day tourists look for a mix of three things; the classical Grand Tour, with the objective of 'toughening up' by experiencing foreign cultures, the post 1960s version of the Grand Tour with the objective of loosening up, and the typical holiday maker, wanting to leave the cares of the world behind. To me, this analysis seems spot on, though the author seems to miss that he's just one of them, with slightly different weights attached to these three portions. Or not. Just a few pages later, he admits to joining them in their activities.
I've been wanting to read anything by Battuta for ages. Battuta, living in the 14th century, is best known as a traveler and explorer, who, in a period of some 30 years, covered around 117,000 km. He visited most of the Islamic world as well as a series of other countries, including parts of North Africa, West Africa, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe in the West, the Middle East, Indian subcontinent, Central Asia,Southeast Asia and China in the East. A distance surpassing that of his predecessor and near-contemporary Marco Polo. If Battuta would be making his journey today, he'd be visiting around 44 countries. Indeed, it's surprising that 30 years of travel can be captured in a mere 240 pages. And that's including notes by the translator.
I stumbled upon this book in a bookstore called Get Lost in San Francisco. Little did I know that a comparable copy is available online. However, the book is not very good. This publication has left the early 19th century translation, by a Rev. Samuel Lee, intact, complete with printing errors and an errata page. With the sometimes archaic English and the changes in spelling and pronunciation of names, this is not the most convenient.
Also, Battuta's style is far from engaging. Mostly losing himself in descriptions of the holy men of the cities he visits, he's a very bad travel writer. Only towards the second half of the book does he become a bit more descriptive of his experiences.
The book, obviously, is extremely suitable to turn into some online interactive map-based experience. And, of course, this has already been done.
What I don't really get is that this guy traveled for almost 30 years. Where did he get the funds and, perhaps more interestingly, how did he constantly manage to get all sorts of riches from the kings and princes he visited on his journeys. I'd be very interested to learn that trick.
I've been wanting to read anything by Battuta for ages. Battuta, living in the 14th century, is best known as a traveler and explorer, who, in a period of some 30 years, covered around 117,000 km. He visited most of the Islamic world as well as a series of other countries, including parts of North Africa, West Africa, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe in the West, the Middle East, Indian subcontinent, Central Asia,Southeast Asia and China in the East. A distance surpassing that of his predecessor and near-contemporary Marco Polo. If Battuta would be making his journey today, he'd be visiting around 44 countries. Indeed, it's surprising that 30 years of travel can be captured in a mere 240 pages. And that's including notes by the translator.
I stumbled upon this book in a bookstore called Get Lost in San Francisco. Little did I know that a comparable copy is available online. However, the book is not very good. This publication has left the early 19th century translation, by a Rev. Samuel Lee, intact, complete with printing errors and an errata page. With the sometimes archaic English and the changes in spelling and pronunciation of names, this is not the most convenient.
Also, Battuta's style is far from engaging. Mostly losing himself in descriptions of the holy men of the cities he visits, he's a very bad travel writer. Only towards the second half of the book does he become a bit more descriptive of his experiences.
The book, obviously, is extremely suitable to turn into some online interactive map-based experience. And, of course, this has already been done.
What I don't really get is that this guy traveled for almost 30 years. Where did he get the funds and, perhaps more interestingly, how did he constantly manage to get all sorts of riches from the kings and princes he visited on his journeys. I'd be very interested to learn that trick.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Hancock, in the opening address puts forward his central premise: The arrival of two comets, some 12800 and 11600 years ago, destroyed an advanced civilisation where the survivors told of a time when 'mankind had fallen out of harmony with the universe'. Hancock then continues, "Did they bring the comets on themselves?", which sounds ominous. In the end, Hancock's claim is reasonable, if not proven directly, but his suggestion this advanced civilisation brought on the comets on themselves, and, as he also claims, this comet is set to return within our lifetime, is spurious.
Up until less then 10 years ago, no evidence existed for the source of two cataclysmic events in the distant past, triggering and ending a mini ice age between roughly 12800 and 11600 years ago. However, in 2007, initial discoveries, which have since been built on extensively, are now very convincing; a crashing meteorite kicked off this mini ice age (the 'Younger Dryas') while some other cataclysmic event ended it some 1200 years later (though for that event, no evidence exists as yet).
Hancock's first stop is at Göbekli Tepe, in southern Turkey, which archeologists pretty much agree on that it is at least 10600 years old, coinciding with the end of the last ice age. Then, Hancock makes an interesting, if fleeting, connection with glyphs at Göbekli Tepe, images of Quetzalcoatl and Oannes, an 'ancient sage' from Mesopotamia, said to have lived before the great flood and who basically brought civilization. The visual similarities, combined with the similar legends of a fish/bird (Middle East) and snake (Central America), personified as a white-skinned bearded strong man at the head of a small group of sages, bringing advanced knowledge of agriculture and architecture, make for an intriguing implication. The time frame, though seems off. Göbekli Tepe being active way before both the Assyrians or early Central American civilizations saw their primary years, or so we believe.
Hancock goes on to describe the megalithic site of Gunung Pradang. In Indonesia, recent archeological tests suggest that the oldest layers, here, date back to perhaps as much as 22000 years ago. Excavations were started to dig deep and confirm these preliminary findings, but the work has since been halted, hopefully temporarily. The lead archeologist at this site believes Gunung Pradang is actually Atlantis.
This is followed by geological proof of major flooding, possibly around 12000 years ago, specifically in north America, presaging the Younger Dryas, which in turn sees Hancock continue to make a credible argument for the impact of a fragmented comet triggering the 1200 year cold spell that was the Younger Dryas, ended by, Hancock suggests, another encounter with debris from perhaps the same comet, this now not hitting the ice caps, but the oceans, resulting in global warming, as opposed to global cooling, within a very short time frame.
Hancock follows this up with a review of ancient myths, beginning with Zoroaster. Hancock claims that 'Zoroaster borrows from much earlier traditions', but that feels somewhat like conjecture. In the Zoroastrian creation myth, the flood is countered by a Noah-like figure who is to build an underground bunker, containing seeds, mostly. Hancock suggests that the underground cities of cappadocia could be those very cities. Of course, possible, as the age of these cities is unknown, but pure speculation.
Then follows a description of the Sumerian creation myths that include the primary bringer of knowledge, Oannes, and his Seven Sages, or wise men. Interesting, but this part of the book is closest to Sitchin's many pretty much fictional stories, even if Hancock is less speculative. One point he emphasizes is that Oannes and his Seven Sages enlightened mankind *before* the flood. After the flood, only surrogates of the sages were left to help mankind along, even if, admitted by much later assyrian and Mesopotamian kings, original, antediluvian, knowledge supposedly still existed.
Hancock then shifts to Edfu, an old temple complex between Luxor and Aswan, containing inscriptions that more than echo Plato's story of Atlantis, going deeper and mirroring the Sumerian creation myth, complete with Seven Sages, serving a master. Though here, the sages are described to have come to Egypt after the destruction of Atlantis, that is, after the flood, as opposed to the Sumerian sages doing their thing before the flood.
Hancock spends a lot of time trying to convince the reader that Egyptian history goes as far back as the flood, through choice pickings of ancient Egyptian texts. But, his wordy treatise takes away from his credibility, as his only objective needs to be making the connection to an antediluvian world plausible, not definite. One connection, which he does makes plausible, is between Gizeh, and Baalbek, in Lebanon. Baalbek, like the sanctuary just north of Gizeh, was called Heliopolos, city of the sun, while there are indications that the Egyptian God Horus actually had come from modern day Lebanon, possibly through a Canaanite connection, the god being represented by a Phoenix, in turn possibly representing a cyclical comet, in turn physically represented by a meteorite, which might have resembled the capstone of the great pyramids.
Next, Hancock returns to Göbekli Tepe, making the claim that a particular depiction on one of the site's pillars represents a stellar configuration that uniquely identifies our time within a range of less than a century (or, to be precise, any similar region in time spaced a good 25000 or multiples thereof, on either side). This seems possible, but the supporting evidence does not seem overly strong to me.
Hancock continues with suggesting that the keepers of ancient wisdom were the Sabians, from the Egyptian for 'star', based in Harran, now in Turkey, while the story of the book of Enoch, a non-canonical bible book only rediscovered some 300 years ago, reinforces stories still available in Genesis, on the Nephilim. The Sabians, worshippers of Hermes, sometimes equated wit Enoch, an antediluvian prophet, survived Islamic prosecution as they managed to claim being people of he book, well, until the 13th century or so, after their last pilgrimage to Gizeh and Islamic golden age. Yet, a copy of the Hermetica, the works of Hermes, showed up with the Italian de Medicis in around 1479, just in time for the discovery of the new world.
Of course, in Hancock's eyes, the Nephilim, or perhaps their angelic parents, are the sages.
In the final chapters, Hancock unnecessarily covers some aspects of both Easter Island and megalithic constructions in Peru.
In short, my take aways: + A meteorite hit earth around 10800BC, resulting in cataclysmic change and a 1200 year long ice age. + Another cataclysmic event happened around 9600BC. + Göbekli Tepe is about 12000 years old, saw its inhabitants create megalithic structures and 'invent' agriculture. + The pyramids probably refer to both the period around 12000 years ago and 2500BC and, perhaps, in part, were constructed much earlier than the generally accepted date of 2500BC. + Baalbek might have been constructed much earlier than currently thought. + Gunung Pradang might date back to around 12000 years ago. + Egyptian creation myths parallel Plato's story of Atlantis and imply referring back to a time that could be as early as 12000 years ago. + Plenty of parallels exist between the Egyptian creation myth and similar myths from other middle eastern peoples. + The Sabians, amongst other ancient cultures, were competent, if not very good, astrologers. + North American Indians have creation myths that seem to talk about a cataclysmic event resembling a major meteor impact.
Hancock's biggest drawback is that he is overly verbose and at times reverts to writing a travelogue. Sticking to the facts, speculating as little as possible, would have done the book, and his credibility, good. Yet, in the end, a plausible theory emerges suggesting that an advanced civilization could have existed before the cataclysmic events of roughly 12000 years ago. Hancock reaches, at times, but his central premise is credible, if still speculative.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Hancock, in the opening address puts forward his central premise: The arrival of two comets, some 12800 and 11600 years ago, destroyed an advanced civilisation where the survivors told of a time when 'mankind had fallen out of harmony with the universe'. Hancock then continues, "Did they bring the comets on themselves?", which sounds ominous. In the end, Hancock's claim is reasonable, if not proven directly, but his suggestion this advanced civilisation brought on the comets on themselves, and, as he also claims, this comet is set to return within our lifetime, is spurious.
Up until less then 10 years ago, no evidence existed for the source of two cataclysmic events in the distant past, triggering and ending a mini ice age between roughly 12800 and 11600 years ago. However, in 2007, initial discoveries, which have since been built on extensively, are now very convincing; a crashing meteorite kicked off this mini ice age (the 'Younger Dryas') while some other cataclysmic event ended it some 1200 years later (though for that event, no evidence exists as yet).
Hancock's first stop is at Göbekli Tepe, in southern Turkey, which archeologists pretty much agree on that it is at least 10600 years old, coinciding with the end of the last ice age. Then, Hancock makes an interesting, if fleeting, connection with glyphs at Göbekli Tepe, images of Quetzalcoatl and Oannes, an 'ancient sage' from Mesopotamia, said to have lived before the great flood and who basically brought civilization. The visual similarities, combined with the similar legends of a fish/bird (Middle East) and snake (Central America), personified as a white-skinned bearded strong man at the head of a small group of sages, bringing advanced knowledge of agriculture and architecture, make for an intriguing implication. The time frame, though seems off. Göbekli Tepe being active way before both the Assyrians or early Central American civilizations saw their primary years, or so we believe.
Hancock goes on to describe the megalithic site of Gunung Pradang. In Indonesia, recent archeological tests suggest that the oldest layers, here, date back to perhaps as much as 22000 years ago. Excavations were started to dig deep and confirm these preliminary findings, but the work has since been halted, hopefully temporarily. The lead archeologist at this site believes Gunung Pradang is actually Atlantis.
This is followed by geological proof of major flooding, possibly around 12000 years ago, specifically in north America, presaging the Younger Dryas, which in turn sees Hancock continue to make a credible argument for the impact of a fragmented comet triggering the 1200 year cold spell that was the Younger Dryas, ended by, Hancock suggests, another encounter with debris from perhaps the same comet, this now not hitting the ice caps, but the oceans, resulting in global warming, as opposed to global cooling, within a very short time frame.
Hancock follows this up with a review of ancient myths, beginning with Zoroaster. Hancock claims that 'Zoroaster borrows from much earlier traditions', but that feels somewhat like conjecture. In the Zoroastrian creation myth, the flood is countered by a Noah-like figure who is to build an underground bunker, containing seeds, mostly. Hancock suggests that the underground cities of cappadocia could be those very cities. Of course, possible, as the age of these cities is unknown, but pure speculation.
Then follows a description of the Sumerian creation myths that include the primary bringer of knowledge, Oannes, and his Seven Sages, or wise men. Interesting, but this part of the book is closest to Sitchin's many pretty much fictional stories, even if Hancock is less speculative. One point he emphasizes is that Oannes and his Seven Sages enlightened mankind *before* the flood. After the flood, only surrogates of the sages were left to help mankind along, even if, admitted by much later assyrian and Mesopotamian kings, original, antediluvian, knowledge supposedly still existed.
Hancock then shifts to Edfu, an old temple complex between Luxor and Aswan, containing inscriptions that more than echo Plato's story of Atlantis, going deeper and mirroring the Sumerian creation myth, complete with Seven Sages, serving a master. Though here, the sages are described to have come to Egypt after the destruction of Atlantis, that is, after the flood, as opposed to the Sumerian sages doing their thing before the flood.
Hancock spends a lot of time trying to convince the reader that Egyptian history goes as far back as the flood, through choice pickings of ancient Egyptian texts. But, his wordy treatise takes away from his credibility, as his only objective needs to be making the connection to an antediluvian world plausible, not definite. One connection, which he does makes plausible, is between Gizeh, and Baalbek, in Lebanon. Baalbek, like the sanctuary just north of Gizeh, was called Heliopolos, city of the sun, while there are indications that the Egyptian God Horus actually had come from modern day Lebanon, possibly through a Canaanite connection, the god being represented by a Phoenix, in turn possibly representing a cyclical comet, in turn physically represented by a meteorite, which might have resembled the capstone of the great pyramids.
Next, Hancock returns to Göbekli Tepe, making the claim that a particular depiction on one of the site's pillars represents a stellar configuration that uniquely identifies our time within a range of less than a century (or, to be precise, any similar region in time spaced a good 25000 or multiples thereof, on either side). This seems possible, but the supporting evidence does not seem overly strong to me.
Hancock continues with suggesting that the keepers of ancient wisdom were the Sabians, from the Egyptian for 'star', based in Harran, now in Turkey, while the story of the book of Enoch, a non-canonical bible book only rediscovered some 300 years ago, reinforces stories still available in Genesis, on the Nephilim. The Sabians, worshippers of Hermes, sometimes equated wit Enoch, an antediluvian prophet, survived Islamic prosecution as they managed to claim being people of he book, well, until the 13th century or so, after their last pilgrimage to Gizeh and Islamic golden age. Yet, a copy of the Hermetica, the works of Hermes, showed up with the Italian de Medicis in around 1479, just in time for the discovery of the new world.
Of course, in Hancock's eyes, the Nephilim, or perhaps their angelic parents, are the sages.
In the final chapters, Hancock unnecessarily covers some aspects of both Easter Island and megalithic constructions in Peru.
In short, my take aways: + A meteorite hit earth around 10800BC, resulting in cataclysmic change and a 1200 year long ice age. + Another cataclysmic event happened around 9600BC. + Göbekli Tepe is about 12000 years old, saw its inhabitants create megalithic structures and 'invent' agriculture. + The pyramids probably refer to both the period around 12000 years ago and 2500BC and, perhaps, in part, were constructed much earlier than the generally accepted date of 2500BC. + Baalbek might have been constructed much earlier than currently thought. + Gunung Pradang might date back to around 12000 years ago. + Egyptian creation myths parallel Plato's story of Atlantis and imply referring back to a time that could be as early as 12000 years ago. + Plenty of parallels exist between the Egyptian creation myth and similar myths from other middle eastern peoples. + The Sabians, amongst other ancient cultures, were competent, if not very good, astrologers. + North American Indians have creation myths that seem to talk about a cataclysmic event resembling a major meteor impact.
Hancock's biggest drawback is that he is overly verbose and at times reverts to writing a travelogue. Sticking to the facts, speculating as little as possible, would have done the book, and his credibility, good. Yet, in the end, a plausible theory emerges suggesting that an advanced civilization could have existed before the cataclysmic events of roughly 12000 years ago. Hancock reaches, at times, but his central premise is credible, if still speculative.
Kurlansky starts off by providing the four factors that contributed to 1968's flurry of revolts:
+ The example that was set in the early 1960s by the civil rights movement. + A generation that felt so different and alienated that it rejected all authority. + A war that was universally hated, providing a cause célèbre. + The emergence of yet-loosely controlled, and therefore much more raw and direct, television.
The book's interesting, but also feels a bit quaint. Focusing primarily on the U.S., with reasonable interest in Poland and Czechoslovakia and with a few sidesteps here and there, many of the stories are fascinating for the detail Kurlansky brings to them, but are also a tad obscure. Many of the leading roles were played by individuals that now have been all but completely lost to history. For example, I was very aware, growing up, of Jan Palace, the Czech student who immolated himself in Prague, protesting the Soviet-induced end of the Prague spring. But, in 1968, before Palach, Ronald W. Brazee did the same to himself in the US, after half a dozen or so had preceded him in the years prior.
There are clear parallels with the rampant dissatisfaction of a younger generation and the established order, then, and the more recent Occupy and Anonymous movements. Kurlansky's book, from 2004, predates these.
It's interesting Kurlansky puts the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union at the botched intervention in Prague in 1968. I'm now reading Charlie Wilson's War, where the author puts the end of the Soviet Union squarely on the shoulders on the American intervention, through the Mujahedin, in Afghanistan.
Kurlansky starts off by providing the four factors that contributed to 1968's flurry of revolts:
+ The example that was set in the early 1960s by the civil rights movement. + A generation that felt so different and alienated that it rejected all authority. + A war that was universally hated, providing a cause célèbre. + The emergence of yet-loosely controlled, and therefore much more raw and direct, television.
The book's interesting, but also feels a bit quaint. Focusing primarily on the U.S., with reasonable interest in Poland and Czechoslovakia and with a few sidesteps here and there, many of the stories are fascinating for the detail Kurlansky brings to them, but are also a tad obscure. Many of the leading roles were played by individuals that now have been all but completely lost to history. For example, I was very aware, growing up, of Jan Palace, the Czech student who immolated himself in Prague, protesting the Soviet-induced end of the Prague spring. But, in 1968, before Palach, Ronald W. Brazee did the same to himself in the US, after half a dozen or so had preceded him in the years prior.
There are clear parallels with the rampant dissatisfaction of a younger generation and the established order, then, and the more recent Occupy and Anonymous movements. Kurlansky's book, from 2004, predates these.
It's interesting Kurlansky puts the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union at the botched intervention in Prague in 1968. I'm now reading Charlie Wilson's War, where the author puts the end of the Soviet Union squarely on the shoulders on the American intervention, through the Mujahedin, in Afghanistan.
This is no frivolous account of a journey along the Silk Road. Introspective, in depth, almost scholarly. I had to read slowly to fully grasp the whole text. A joy. The author traveled from beyond Xian, in the heart of China and once the imperial capital, also the home of the terra-cotta warriors, to the Mediterranean at Antioch, now Antalya.
Not only is Thubron's journey epic, his retelling is fantastic. His prose is gorgeous, his sentiment melancholic. Interspersed with in-depth histories of peoples, heroes and geographies, this is perhaps the most impressive travel story I've ever read. But... He flies from Maimana, in northwestern Afghanistan, to Herat. Who has recently traveled the Silk Road without chickening out somewhere?
Thubron easily gives Theroux a run for his money.
At last, clarity as to why typical central Asian shoes have upturned noses: to reduce friction in the sand!
"I'm afraid of, on my travels, nothing happening, experiencing nothing. Emptiness. Of only hearing myself."
This is no frivolous account of a journey along the Silk Road. Introspective, in depth, almost scholarly. I had to read slowly to fully grasp the whole text. A joy. The author traveled from beyond Xian, in the heart of China and once the imperial capital, also the home of the terra-cotta warriors, to the Mediterranean at Antioch, now Antalya.
Not only is Thubron's journey epic, his retelling is fantastic. His prose is gorgeous, his sentiment melancholic. Interspersed with in-depth histories of peoples, heroes and geographies, this is perhaps the most impressive travel story I've ever read. But... He flies from Maimana, in northwestern Afghanistan, to Herat. Who has recently traveled the Silk Road without chickening out somewhere?
Thubron easily gives Theroux a run for his money.
At last, clarity as to why typical central Asian shoes have upturned noses: to reduce friction in the sand!
"I'm afraid of, on my travels, nothing happening, experiencing nothing. Emptiness. Of only hearing myself."
- Ed Young
- Francesco Carotta
- Joseph Horvath
- Tommie Hendricks
- Manfred Junghardt
- Erika Simon
- Fotis Kavoukopoulos
I read the Dutch version of this book a few years ago and accepted the likelihood of the central tenet of Carotta's thesis: the story of the life of Jesus was derived from the life of Julius Caesar. Carotta first published his theory in the book War Jesus Caesar?2000 Jahre Anbetung Einer Kopie in 1999, which was followed by Was Jezus Caesar ?, the Dutch translation, with updated texts a few years later, which I read. This English translation from 2005, which I've had in my possession for a few years now and hadn't gotten round to reading, includes a significant amount of re-evaluated research with a lot of updated details.
Outlandish as the claim may sound at first, Carotta has a very strong case, showing that the parallels between Jesus' and Caesar's lives are so strong and showing so many straightforward derivations of names and places from the life of Caesar showing up in the story of the life of Jesus, that his claim almost becomes a no-brainer.
It's no secret that no (contemporary) historical evidence exists for the existence of Jesus and scholars agree that a lot of the Jesus cult, if you will, was derived from earlier pagan religions. However, Carotta goes much further and postulates that the sudden introduction of the Jesus myth was actually triggered by actual events, distorted as they ended up being. Besides the trivial parallels, such as initials (JC), date of death (the Ides, the 15th, of March) and year of birth (100 years apart), the oddity that the highest seat of Christianity is in Rome, Caesar becoming Pontifex Maximus in 63BC, a title which was passed on, through the Roman emperors, to the popes, the first churches being erected at Caesar (proclaimed God by his peers) and Augustus (by extension the son of God) temples (with the most prominent one, of course, in Rome), the parallels are in fact much stronger and deeper. Carotta shows that the parallels are so overwhelming, they can not simply be coincidental.
Perhaps not surprisingly, with three or four major world religions at stake, all of them accepting the historical truth of Jesus' existence, though valuing him differently, Carotta's theory has had a hard time to reach the public. Surprisingly, however, Carotta is neither the first nor the only one who claims the existence of strong connections between the story of the life of Jesus and the life of Caesar. Also, because of the forced disinterest of both the media and the public at large, Carotta has had a hard time funding his research, resulting in a diverse group of semi-pro translators working on this English release, resulting in the occasional style changes and editorial glitches. However, the quality and depth of this version of Carotta's book is excellent.
It won't be my task to convince you of the likelihood of Carotta's theory, but here are few interesting tidbits.
+ After his capture, Jesus practically refrains from speaking (and the gospels can't agree on his last words). Was he killed at his capture? + Early depictions of Jesus show him as being beardless and, on the cross, in a stretched out position, not hanging (though imagery of individuals hanging on a cross existed). Does it, then, depict an actual crucifixion? + The only verifiable historical characters from the gospels are Pilate and Herod. + "God the father", in Latin, being derived from the word "Jupiter" (via "Deo Pater"). Gotta love stuff like that. + Caesar crossed the Rubicon on January 6. The day the coming of the Messiah was celebrated by the arrival of the three kings (who, incidentally, can easily be explained as representing parts of Octavianus', that is Augustus', past). + The Arab name for 'god' obviously being close to Caesar's first name, Carotta suggests that the birth of Islam might just be the result of former Roman colonies initiated by Antonius and/or Cleopatra working with different versions of books on the life of Caesar than the rest of the former Roman empire. For example, they would not recognize the baby Jesus, that is Octavianus, as the son of God. This, of course, because Antonius and Cleopatra fought and, eventually died, fighting the adopted son of Caesar, that is, son of God. + Carotta points out some parallels between Buddhism and the Augustus cult. Perhaps far fetched at first, proof of Buddha's historical existence is almost as shaky as Jesus', and not unlikely, because Octavianus' early years were modeled in part on Alexander the Great's early years, Alexander had such a large geographical reach and was more of a contemporary with the Buddha, these parallels might indeed be more than trivial, though perhaps not direct. + The imagery used around the nativity scene can easily be traced back to imagery related to the early years of Octavianus. + The Latin for the Ides of March is "eid(ibus) mar(tiis)". The Arab word for feast is "eid". Related?
My major gripe with Carotta's book is that he presents the research in such a way that it seems the conclusion of whether the life of Jesus was modeled on that of Caesar's could go either way for a long time. However, it's obvious from the start that the only conclusion will be that Jesus was Caesar, which gives off the feeling of the result being premeditated, making it less authentic, giving the book an air of trickery. Additionally, after going through half the book or so, you get the picture, Carotta tries to trace every story in Mark back to an event in Caesar's life, and succeeds reasonably well, but at some point, as the method, which is explaining the mistranslations involved, stays the same, it ends up being like redoing the same trick over and over again.
That's not to say that I find Carotta's presentation of how the original texts on the life of Caesar were so heavily bastardized over time very credible. When I studied, well attempted to study, Latin in school and had to do exams, I would understand enough of texts which needed to be translated to get bits right, but by far not enough to come even close to the original meanings of the texts, basically inventing interpolations just to make sense of the bits I did understand. I had perfectly legible Latin texts to work with. The first evangelists had badly hand copied texts, some of whom probably didn't understand Latin better than I did at school.
I read the Dutch version of this book a few years ago and accepted the likelihood of the central tenet of Carotta's thesis: the story of the life of Jesus was derived from the life of Julius Caesar. Carotta first published his theory in the book War Jesus Caesar?2000 Jahre Anbetung Einer Kopie in 1999, which was followed by Was Jezus Caesar ?, the Dutch translation, with updated texts a few years later, which I read. This English translation from 2005, which I've had in my possession for a few years now and hadn't gotten round to reading, includes a significant amount of re-evaluated research with a lot of updated details.
Outlandish as the claim may sound at first, Carotta has a very strong case, showing that the parallels between Jesus' and Caesar's lives are so strong and showing so many straightforward derivations of names and places from the life of Caesar showing up in the story of the life of Jesus, that his claim almost becomes a no-brainer.
It's no secret that no (contemporary) historical evidence exists for the existence of Jesus and scholars agree that a lot of the Jesus cult, if you will, was derived from earlier pagan religions. However, Carotta goes much further and postulates that the sudden introduction of the Jesus myth was actually triggered by actual events, distorted as they ended up being. Besides the trivial parallels, such as initials (JC), date of death (the Ides, the 15th, of March) and year of birth (100 years apart), the oddity that the highest seat of Christianity is in Rome, Caesar becoming Pontifex Maximus in 63BC, a title which was passed on, through the Roman emperors, to the popes, the first churches being erected at Caesar (proclaimed God by his peers) and Augustus (by extension the son of God) temples (with the most prominent one, of course, in Rome), the parallels are in fact much stronger and deeper. Carotta shows that the parallels are so overwhelming, they can not simply be coincidental.
Perhaps not surprisingly, with three or four major world religions at stake, all of them accepting the historical truth of Jesus' existence, though valuing him differently, Carotta's theory has had a hard time to reach the public. Surprisingly, however, Carotta is neither the first nor the only one who claims the existence of strong connections between the story of the life of Jesus and the life of Caesar. Also, because of the forced disinterest of both the media and the public at large, Carotta has had a hard time funding his research, resulting in a diverse group of semi-pro translators working on this English release, resulting in the occasional style changes and editorial glitches. However, the quality and depth of this version of Carotta's book is excellent.
It won't be my task to convince you of the likelihood of Carotta's theory, but here are few interesting tidbits.
+ After his capture, Jesus practically refrains from speaking (and the gospels can't agree on his last words). Was he killed at his capture? + Early depictions of Jesus show him as being beardless and, on the cross, in a stretched out position, not hanging (though imagery of individuals hanging on a cross existed). Does it, then, depict an actual crucifixion? + The only verifiable historical characters from the gospels are Pilate and Herod. + "God the father", in Latin, being derived from the word "Jupiter" (via "Deo Pater"). Gotta love stuff like that. + Caesar crossed the Rubicon on January 6. The day the coming of the Messiah was celebrated by the arrival of the three kings (who, incidentally, can easily be explained as representing parts of Octavianus', that is Augustus', past). + The Arab name for 'god' obviously being close to Caesar's first name, Carotta suggests that the birth of Islam might just be the result of former Roman colonies initiated by Antonius and/or Cleopatra working with different versions of books on the life of Caesar than the rest of the former Roman empire. For example, they would not recognize the baby Jesus, that is Octavianus, as the son of God. This, of course, because Antonius and Cleopatra fought and, eventually died, fighting the adopted son of Caesar, that is, son of God. + Carotta points out some parallels between Buddhism and the Augustus cult. Perhaps far fetched at first, proof of Buddha's historical existence is almost as shaky as Jesus', and not unlikely, because Octavianus' early years were modeled in part on Alexander the Great's early years, Alexander had such a large geographical reach and was more of a contemporary with the Buddha, these parallels might indeed be more than trivial, though perhaps not direct. + The imagery used around the nativity scene can easily be traced back to imagery related to the early years of Octavianus. + The Latin for the Ides of March is "eid(ibus) mar(tiis)". The Arab word for feast is "eid". Related?
My major gripe with Carotta's book is that he presents the research in such a way that it seems the conclusion of whether the life of Jesus was modeled on that of Caesar's could go either way for a long time. However, it's obvious from the start that the only conclusion will be that Jesus was Caesar, which gives off the feeling of the result being premeditated, making it less authentic, giving the book an air of trickery. Additionally, after going through half the book or so, you get the picture, Carotta tries to trace every story in Mark back to an event in Caesar's life, and succeeds reasonably well, but at some point, as the method, which is explaining the mistranslations involved, stays the same, it ends up being like redoing the same trick over and over again.
That's not to say that I find Carotta's presentation of how the original texts on the life of Caesar were so heavily bastardized over time very credible. When I studied, well attempted to study, Latin in school and had to do exams, I would understand enough of texts which needed to be translated to get bits right, but by far not enough to come even close to the original meanings of the texts, basically inventing interpolations just to make sense of the bits I did understand. I had perfectly legible Latin texts to work with. The first evangelists had badly hand copied texts, some of whom probably didn't understand Latin better than I did at school.
Even though iran's political woes have been played out in the press over recent years, the primary underlying cause for Iran's political establishment's disenchantment with the US and, to some extent, Britain, is still understood by few, outside of Iran. The root cause is the 1953 coup which was fully staged by the US, with support from and after asking for help by the British, removing the democratically elected president Mohammad Mosaddegh and setting the stage for the 1979 revolution, a quarter of a century later. Indeed, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, which saw Carter's chances of getting reelected evaporate and delivered 8 years of the white house to Ronald Reagan, were staged as a direct reaction to the US allowing the ousted Shah to seek medical treatment in America. As this was seen as explicit support for Iran's royal family, many Iranians expected a similar turn of events as a good 25 years earlier, when it was also the United States who helped the Shah get back on the throne after he had fled the country in the wake of a failed initial attempt at removing Mossadegh.
Sadly, the whole episode of removing Mosaddegh was the result of a very one sided business deal between a British millionaire and the previous Iranian royal dynasty, some 45 years prior, which had been finalized on wildly unreasonable terms for the Iranians. With the British their colonial mindset and Churchill, the archetypical colonialist, reclaiming the British Prime Minister's seat in 1952, Iran's demands of more favorable terms fell on deaf ears. As a result, the Brits presenting their conflict to the newly elected American president Eisenhower as a conflict between East and West, after Mossadegh had expelled all Brits from Iranian soil and nationalized the oil company, it was Eisenhower who became the torchbearer of British interests, inheriting the Brits' intelligence apparatus and, eventually, using it to crush the, at least then, most democratic government in the Middle East. The levels of profit raked in by this oil company, both before and after the coup, were astronomical, yet little flowed back into Iranian coffers. Originally known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it changed its name in 1954, to British Petroleum.
Kinzer's book, full of details which were uncovered little under a decade ago with a partial opening up of the CIA archives, is a thrilling read and makes it very clear that if only the Americans would have stayed away in 1953, Iran would most likely have been the most democratic country in the middle east for decades. That's not to say everything hinged on the US' decision to instigate the coup. More than half a dozen of crucial moments could have gone just slightly different and would have resulted in a much more favorable outcome for both Iran and Mossadegh. But alas.
Even though iran's political woes have been played out in the press over recent years, the primary underlying cause for Iran's political establishment's disenchantment with the US and, to some extent, Britain, is still understood by few, outside of Iran. The root cause is the 1953 coup which was fully staged by the US, with support from and after asking for help by the British, removing the democratically elected president Mohammad Mosaddegh and setting the stage for the 1979 revolution, a quarter of a century later. Indeed, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, which saw Carter's chances of getting reelected evaporate and delivered 8 years of the white house to Ronald Reagan, were staged as a direct reaction to the US allowing the ousted Shah to seek medical treatment in America. As this was seen as explicit support for Iran's royal family, many Iranians expected a similar turn of events as a good 25 years earlier, when it was also the United States who helped the Shah get back on the throne after he had fled the country in the wake of a failed initial attempt at removing Mossadegh.
Sadly, the whole episode of removing Mosaddegh was the result of a very one sided business deal between a British millionaire and the previous Iranian royal dynasty, some 45 years prior, which had been finalized on wildly unreasonable terms for the Iranians. With the British their colonial mindset and Churchill, the archetypical colonialist, reclaiming the British Prime Minister's seat in 1952, Iran's demands of more favorable terms fell on deaf ears. As a result, the Brits presenting their conflict to the newly elected American president Eisenhower as a conflict between East and West, after Mossadegh had expelled all Brits from Iranian soil and nationalized the oil company, it was Eisenhower who became the torchbearer of British interests, inheriting the Brits' intelligence apparatus and, eventually, using it to crush the, at least then, most democratic government in the Middle East. The levels of profit raked in by this oil company, both before and after the coup, were astronomical, yet little flowed back into Iranian coffers. Originally known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it changed its name in 1954, to British Petroleum.
Kinzer's book, full of details which were uncovered little under a decade ago with a partial opening up of the CIA archives, is a thrilling read and makes it very clear that if only the Americans would have stayed away in 1953, Iran would most likely have been the most democratic country in the middle east for decades. That's not to say everything hinged on the US' decision to instigate the coup. More than half a dozen of crucial moments could have gone just slightly different and would have resulted in a much more favorable outcome for both Iran and Mossadegh. But alas.
In essence, the book is a compendium of salt-related trivia against a backdrop of world history. This is not as weird as it sounds, as salt is an essential commodity and has often been under strict state control, from China to ancient Rome.
A few interesting bits:
+ The ancient Romans sometimes payed their soldiers in salt, the source of the word 'salary'. + The Frenchified version of 'salary', 'solde', is the source for the word 'soldier'. + 'Hal' is a word for 'salt'. Presumably Germanic or Keltic, but the author does not disclose that information. That means that cities like Halle, Hallstad and quite a few others (in Europe) were named after their major souce of income. + The word for the French used by the Romans, 'Gaul', also hails from the same linguistic source. + 'Salad' comes from the Romans putting salt on their veggies. + Kurlansky (when writing the book in 2002) draws parallels between the European Celts and the Tarim mummies of Uighur China. Something in which he seems to have been proven right.
In essence, the book is a compendium of salt-related trivia against a backdrop of world history. This is not as weird as it sounds, as salt is an essential commodity and has often been under strict state control, from China to ancient Rome.
A few interesting bits:
+ The ancient Romans sometimes payed their soldiers in salt, the source of the word 'salary'. + The Frenchified version of 'salary', 'solde', is the source for the word 'soldier'. + 'Hal' is a word for 'salt'. Presumably Germanic or Keltic, but the author does not disclose that information. That means that cities like Halle, Hallstad and quite a few others (in Europe) were named after their major souce of income. + The word for the French used by the Romans, 'Gaul', also hails from the same linguistic source. + 'Salad' comes from the Romans putting salt on their veggies. + Kurlansky (when writing the book in 2002) draws parallels between the European Celts and the Tarim mummies of Uighur China. Something in which he seems to have been proven right.
Superbly readable biography of a Galician Jew who converted to Islam, was born in 1900 and covering the first 32 years of his life.
His description of his life in Central Europe in the early 1920s is surprisingly recognizable for its moral decay and his clear fascination and adoption of Islam is both well explained and credible. And even though his love for Islam is occasionally seen through too rosy tinted glasses, he is also not completely without critique.
Superbly readable biography of a Galician Jew who converted to Islam, was born in 1900 and covering the first 32 years of his life.
His description of his life in Central Europe in the early 1920s is surprisingly recognizable for its moral decay and his clear fascination and adoption of Islam is both well explained and credible. And even though his love for Islam is occasionally seen through too rosy tinted glasses, he is also not completely without critique.
