david.doolin

I have the PDF file, can't beat the price as it's freely downloadable.

This is an almanac or compendium providing a very high level overview of USAF operations during the Vietnam War. It's well designed, providing statistics by year and photographs of most of the aircraft operating in theater. Along with the photographs, a brief description of the aircraft's role during the conflict is provided. Having read numerous accounts of the war, seeing photos of the aircraft involved is very helpul.

A fairly light read, and considerably better than I thought it would be. Having lived through the 80s-90s when Jack Welch was Public Enemy #1 in the popular press, it was refreshing to read Jack's side of the story, and get some real insight into stack ranking. Let me rephrase that I got insight into stack ranking. I have no idea if anyone has. I should also add that my father worked for GE for a number of years in motors, which was eventually sold to Regal Beloit. He did well enough at both companies.

I would not then nor now want to work for Jack Welch. Neither would I have then or now join GE or a similar company (eh... Netflix). Not how I want to my life, but I appreciate the aggression and passion with which these businesses operate.

Explains a lot.

I read this on Kindle, and would one day like to own the print version for the maps and photos. While these monographs vary in perspective, this one read a bit more matter of fact than some of the others. Perhaps a bit optimistic, but little of the bitterness that occasionally pops up in others of the series.

A second read extracts material I can put into practice immediately, particularly around execution, and much material I can use to nudge towards better innovation.

Upshot: Apparently, Kennedy was a Francophobe, and probably influenced by France's foreign policy failures and WWII record. De Gaulle was arrogant, proud, and apparently bent on France being a super power player. Not a situation where de Gaulle's lessons late learned would make much impression on a youthful administration riding a wave of successes.

Very, very tactical. A bit of a counterpoint to, say, Deep Work. Good reinforcement for many tactics I've used or currently using, and good validation on how I use caffeine.

The staggering volume of Marxist-Leninist claptrap precludes easily extracting strategic lessons. Or perhaps that is one of the lessons.

The best of the series so far.

Good NVA OOB for Easter Offensive.

Detailed and intricate analysis of the structure of GVN intelligence services, operations, successes, and failures during the Vietnam war.

First half outlines the thinking and structure pursued by GVN and FWA for nation building in the hinterland. Second half details successes and failures. Per previous monographs in this series, fingers are occasionally pointed, but the author's restraint is admirable. Stats for VC terror are listed. FWA military involvement put into context of DRV's military escalation resulting from at least partial GVN successes with the various hamlet and village programs instituted by the Diem administration. Reread.

Worth rereading in some detail, specifically to better understand the sequence of reorganizations, scope changes, and mission changes for RF/PF and related units.

Gen. Vongsavanh provides names, dates, and locations for actions glossed over in other accounts. Very helpful for understanding the situation on the ground, especially during period 1970-1973.

Will need to reread very carefully, probably more than once.

I've seen much of Dando describes in action at several companies.

Key point: information storage is not the same skill as information retrieval.

Outstanding account of ARVN.

Second read.

The essential conundrum is that the only person who can implement the team of teams notion effectively has to be 1. unequivocally in charge of the entire enterprise, and 2. secure enough to voluntarily cede power down the chain.

Long on theory, light on practice.

I happened to be reading this during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

I liked this a lot more than I thought I would. I am curious how his outlook would differ between when the book was published in 2005 and 2022.

I'm probably in the audience for this book, but I'm finding it hard to rate it accurately as I'm already familiar with most of the material the author covers. However, I did find two things notable:

1. The author calls out Friedman on the “greed is good” theory of corporate operation, that is, maximizing shareholder value being the sole concern of a corporation. I have never believed this myself, and with “corporate personhood” established by the law, it's no surprise a large amount of corporate behavior is sociopathic at best. We imprison people for taking “me first” to its logical conclusion, incorporating should come with more social responsibility, not less. Friedman got a Nobel prize for this notion. The author takes Friedman to task, and in my opinion rightly so.

2. I feel the author was unduly harsh on Jack Welch. This may be because I'm currently reading Welch's “Winning,” and can see the mismatch between what Welch writes and how it's taken. For example, Welch's description of stack ranking (differentiation) does not square with what I've read about it, nor what I've experienced directly by way of family working for GE during Welch's tenure. Specifically, Welch spends a lot of words advocating for the middle 70%. That part isn't much discussed by the author, or other authors, and certainly not executed on in my experience. The irony is that Welch and the author are much more closely aligned on people development than the author writes.

Pretty airy for my taste. Team of Teams seems to cover much of the practical application.

First person account covering most of 1968 from USMC grunt's perspective.