From the Danube to the Yalu

A sequel to Calculated Risk -- and of more immediate interest and news value in that this is primarily the story of General Clark's year of duty in Korea, a year that saw the cease fire -- and the endless months of almost fruitless negotiations -- and the Little and Big Switch POW operations. A year on which he entered just as the shameful Communist- stimulated prison riots were highlighted by the snatching of General Dodd, and the concessions of General Colson. But it is much more than just a record of events. It is a penetrating and fearless commentary on the basic weaknesses of American policy that made possible the burgeoning growth of Soviet power, from the concessions made at the Danube, the clauses in the Balkan peace terms which gave Russia practically free entry, the yielding to the (often Communist inspired) demand for swift demobilization, the growing chain of evidence of Communists in both working and planning levels in Army and State Departments. Some of this was offset by the Marshall Plan, by Point Four. But decisions were repeatedly made, damaging to America in Europe, in Asia, proof not necessarily of collusion, but of our amateurs facing Soviet professionals across the conference table, of our reluctance to face the fact that only FORCE is the answer to Soviet duplicity. When he came to Korea, he saw three choices:- stalemate continued, a decisive victory, an honorable armistice. He accepted the third decision, though he did not- and does not-agree that it was the right one. He felt a second chance was given when Eisenhower became President; and again attempted to follow through on the decision. This is a closeup of the political along with the diplomatic and military operation as is possible today. There's an immense amount of absorbing analysis and detail of successive moves and countermoves, personalities, conflicts, advances and set-backs; there's the actual record of the case histories taken from the released prisoners, which formed the backbone of Lodge's report to the U.N. And throughout General Clark does not hesitate to speak his mind. Quoting from his text this book might better have been titled Unfinished Business.