Babak Fakhamzadeh
Even though iran's political woes have been played out in the press over recent years, the primary underlying cause for Iran's political establishment's disenchantment with the US and, to some extent, Britain, is still understood by few, outside of Iran. The root cause is the 1953 coup which was fully staged by the US, with support from and after asking for help by the British, removing the democratically elected president Mohammad Mosaddegh and setting the stage for the 1979 revolution, a quarter of a century later. Indeed, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, which saw Carter's chances of getting reelected evaporate and delivered 8 years of the white house to Ronald Reagan, were staged as a direct reaction to the US allowing the ousted Shah to seek medical treatment in America. As this was seen as explicit support for Iran's royal family, many Iranians expected a similar turn of events as a good 25 years earlier, when it was also the United States who helped the Shah get back on the throne after he had fled the country in the wake of a failed initial attempt at removing Mossadegh.
Sadly, the whole episode of removing Mosaddegh was the result of a very one sided business deal between a British millionaire and the previous Iranian royal dynasty, some 45 years prior, which had been finalized on wildly unreasonable terms for the Iranians. With the British their colonial mindset and Churchill, the archetypical colonialist, reclaiming the British Prime Minister's seat in 1952, Iran's demands of more favorable terms fell on deaf ears. As a result, the Brits presenting their conflict to the newly elected American president Eisenhower as a conflict between East and West, after Mossadegh had expelled all Brits from Iranian soil and nationalized the oil company, it was Eisenhower who became the torchbearer of British interests, inheriting the Brits' intelligence apparatus and, eventually, using it to crush the, at least then, most democratic government in the Middle East. The levels of profit raked in by this oil company, both before and after the coup, were astronomical, yet little flowed back into Iranian coffers. Originally known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it changed its name in 1954, to British Petroleum.
Kinzer's book, full of details which were uncovered little under a decade ago with a partial opening up of the CIA archives, is a thrilling read and makes it very clear that if only the Americans would have stayed away in 1953, Iran would most likely have been the most democratic country in the middle east for decades. That's not to say everything hinged on the US' decision to instigate the coup. More than half a dozen of crucial moments could have gone just slightly different and would have resulted in a much more favorable outcome for both Iran and Mossadegh. But alas.
Even though iran's political woes have been played out in the press over recent years, the primary underlying cause for Iran's political establishment's disenchantment with the US and, to some extent, Britain, is still understood by few, outside of Iran. The root cause is the 1953 coup which was fully staged by the US, with support from and after asking for help by the British, removing the democratically elected president Mohammad Mosaddegh and setting the stage for the 1979 revolution, a quarter of a century later. Indeed, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, which saw Carter's chances of getting reelected evaporate and delivered 8 years of the white house to Ronald Reagan, were staged as a direct reaction to the US allowing the ousted Shah to seek medical treatment in America. As this was seen as explicit support for Iran's royal family, many Iranians expected a similar turn of events as a good 25 years earlier, when it was also the United States who helped the Shah get back on the throne after he had fled the country in the wake of a failed initial attempt at removing Mossadegh.
Sadly, the whole episode of removing Mosaddegh was the result of a very one sided business deal between a British millionaire and the previous Iranian royal dynasty, some 45 years prior, which had been finalized on wildly unreasonable terms for the Iranians. With the British their colonial mindset and Churchill, the archetypical colonialist, reclaiming the British Prime Minister's seat in 1952, Iran's demands of more favorable terms fell on deaf ears. As a result, the Brits presenting their conflict to the newly elected American president Eisenhower as a conflict between East and West, after Mossadegh had expelled all Brits from Iranian soil and nationalized the oil company, it was Eisenhower who became the torchbearer of British interests, inheriting the Brits' intelligence apparatus and, eventually, using it to crush the, at least then, most democratic government in the Middle East. The levels of profit raked in by this oil company, both before and after the coup, were astronomical, yet little flowed back into Iranian coffers. Originally known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it changed its name in 1954, to British Petroleum.
Kinzer's book, full of details which were uncovered little under a decade ago with a partial opening up of the CIA archives, is a thrilling read and makes it very clear that if only the Americans would have stayed away in 1953, Iran would most likely have been the most democratic country in the middle east for decades. That's not to say everything hinged on the US' decision to instigate the coup. More than half a dozen of crucial moments could have gone just slightly different and would have resulted in a much more favorable outcome for both Iran and Mossadegh. But alas.