Babak Fakhamzadeh

Advice on how to participate in a successful debate and discussion.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Hancock, in the opening address puts forward his central premise: The arrival of two comets, some 12800 and 11600 years ago, destroyed an advanced civilisation where the survivors told of a time when 'mankind had fallen out of harmony with the universe'. Hancock then continues, "Did they bring the comets on themselves?", which sounds ominous. In the end, Hancock's claim is reasonable, if not proven directly, but his suggestion this advanced civilisation brought on the comets on themselves, and, as he also claims, this comet is set to return within our lifetime, is spurious.

Up until less then 10 years ago, no evidence existed for the source of two cataclysmic events in the distant past, triggering and ending a mini ice age between roughly 12800 and 11600 years ago. However, in 2007, initial discoveries, which have since been built on extensively, are now very convincing; a crashing meteorite kicked off this mini ice age (the 'Younger Dryas') while some other cataclysmic event ended it some 1200 years later (though for that event, no evidence exists as yet).

Hancock's first stop is at Göbekli Tepe, in southern Turkey, which archeologists pretty much agree on that it is at least 10600 years old, coinciding with the end of the last ice age. Then, Hancock makes an interesting, if fleeting, connection with glyphs at Göbekli Tepe, images of Quetzalcoatl and Oannes, an 'ancient sage' from Mesopotamia, said to have lived before the great flood and who basically brought civilization. The visual similarities, combined with the similar legends of a fish/bird (Middle East) and snake (Central America), personified as a white-skinned bearded strong man at the head of a small group of sages, bringing advanced knowledge of agriculture and architecture, make for an intriguing implication. The time frame, though seems off. Göbekli Tepe being active way before both the Assyrians or early Central American civilizations saw their primary years, or so we believe.

Hancock goes on to describe the megalithic site of Gunung Pradang. In Indonesia, recent archeological tests suggest that the oldest layers, here, date back to perhaps as much as 22000 years ago. Excavations were started to dig deep and confirm these preliminary findings, but the work has since been halted, hopefully temporarily. The lead archeologist at this site believes Gunung Pradang is actually Atlantis.

This is followed by geological proof of major flooding, possibly around 12000 years ago, specifically in north America, presaging the Younger Dryas, which in turn sees Hancock continue to make a credible argument for the impact of a fragmented comet triggering the 1200 year cold spell that was the Younger Dryas, ended by, Hancock suggests, another encounter with debris from perhaps the same comet, this now not hitting the ice caps, but the oceans, resulting in global warming, as opposed to global cooling, within a very short time frame.

Hancock follows this up with a review of ancient myths, beginning with Zoroaster. Hancock claims that 'Zoroaster borrows from much earlier traditions', but that feels somewhat like conjecture. In the Zoroastrian creation myth, the flood is countered by a Noah-like figure who is to build an underground bunker, containing seeds, mostly. Hancock suggests that the underground cities of cappadocia could be those very cities. Of course, possible, as the age of these cities is unknown, but pure speculation.

Then follows a description of the Sumerian creation myths that include the primary bringer of knowledge, Oannes, and his Seven Sages, or wise men. Interesting, but this part of the book is closest to Sitchin's many pretty much fictional stories, even if Hancock is less speculative. One point he emphasizes is that Oannes and his Seven Sages enlightened mankind *before* the flood. After the flood, only surrogates of the sages were left to help mankind along, even if, admitted by much later assyrian and Mesopotamian kings, original, antediluvian, knowledge supposedly still existed.

Hancock then shifts to Edfu, an old temple complex between Luxor and Aswan, containing inscriptions that more than echo Plato's story of Atlantis, going deeper and mirroring the Sumerian creation myth, complete with Seven Sages, serving a master. Though here, the sages are described to have come to Egypt after the destruction of Atlantis, that is, after the flood, as opposed to the Sumerian sages doing their thing before the flood.

Hancock spends a lot of time trying to convince the reader that Egyptian history goes as far back as the flood, through choice pickings of ancient Egyptian texts. But, his wordy treatise takes away from his credibility, as his only objective needs to be making the connection to an antediluvian world plausible, not definite. One connection, which he does makes plausible, is between Gizeh, and Baalbek, in Lebanon. Baalbek, like the sanctuary just north of Gizeh, was called Heliopolos, city of the sun, while there are indications that the Egyptian God Horus actually had come from modern day Lebanon, possibly through a Canaanite connection, the god being represented by a Phoenix, in turn possibly representing a cyclical comet, in turn physically represented by a meteorite, which might have resembled the capstone of the great pyramids.

Next, Hancock returns to Göbekli Tepe, making the claim that a particular depiction on one of the site's pillars represents a stellar configuration that uniquely identifies our time within a range of less than a century (or, to be precise, any similar region in time spaced a good 25000 or multiples thereof, on either side). This seems possible, but the supporting evidence does not seem overly strong to me.

Hancock continues with suggesting that the keepers of ancient wisdom were the Sabians, from the Egyptian for 'star', based in Harran, now in Turkey, while the story of the book of Enoch, a non-canonical bible book only rediscovered some 300 years ago, reinforces stories still available in Genesis, on the Nephilim. The Sabians, worshippers of Hermes, sometimes equated wit Enoch, an antediluvian prophet, survived Islamic prosecution as they managed to claim being people of he book, well, until the 13th century or so, after their last pilgrimage to Gizeh and Islamic golden age. Yet, a copy of the Hermetica, the works of Hermes, showed up with the Italian de Medicis in around 1479, just in time for the discovery of the new world.

Of course, in Hancock's eyes, the Nephilim, or perhaps their angelic parents, are the sages.

In the final chapters, Hancock unnecessarily covers some aspects of both Easter Island and megalithic constructions in Peru.

In short, my take aways: + A meteorite hit earth around 10800BC, resulting in cataclysmic change and a 1200 year long ice age. + Another cataclysmic event happened around 9600BC. + Göbekli Tepe is about 12000 years old, saw its inhabitants create megalithic structures and 'invent' agriculture. + The pyramids probably refer to both the period around 12000 years ago and 2500BC and, perhaps, in part, were constructed much earlier than the generally accepted date of 2500BC. + Baalbek might have been constructed much earlier than currently thought. + Gunung Pradang might date back to around 12000 years ago. + Egyptian creation myths parallel Plato's story of Atlantis and imply referring back to a time that could be as early as 12000 years ago. + Plenty of parallels exist between the Egyptian creation myth and similar myths from other middle eastern peoples. + The Sabians, amongst other ancient cultures, were competent, if not very good, astrologers. + North American Indians have creation myths that seem to talk about a cataclysmic event resembling a major meteor impact.

Hancock's biggest drawback is that he is overly verbose and at times reverts to writing a travelogue. Sticking to the facts, speculating as little as possible, would have done the book, and his credibility, good. Yet, in the end, a plausible theory emerges suggesting that an advanced civilization could have existed before the cataclysmic events of roughly 12000 years ago. Hancock reaches, at times, but his central premise is credible, if still speculative.

An important little book, even if Cockburn repeats himself often, while the book lacks structure. Cockburn, in a nutshell, gives much needed, if basic, information on how the key players in the current Middle Eastern conflict relate to each other.
In short, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

ISIS benefited from the rise of Sunni resistance in Syria as well as the Sunni repression In Iraq. Effectively, ISIS managed to hijack the anti-Assad movement in Syria, while the blanket anti-Sunni sentiments in Shia-dominated Iraq result in, for most Sunni, ISIS being seen as the lesser of two evils.
Add to that the support of specifically both Turkey and Saudi Arabia for opposition movements roughly aligned with ISIS and, in part, the US' desire to unseat Assad and, therefore, also effectively supporting ISIS in their anti-Assad actions, it was also the much earlier mistake of the US, after 9/11, to not address the elephants in the room, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as the main supporters of anti-US terrorism, that has led to the current entanglement of objectives by the many players in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, by insisting that Assad should go as a precondition of peace, while knowing this is not going to happen, his enemies are in practice ensuring that the war will go on.

A superbly comprehensive overview of the conflicts in the Congo following the Rwandan genocide, which eventually spilled over into the DRC.
The author himself points out the the successive wars in the Congo from the mid nineties onwards can not be boiled down to a simple narrative. And indeed, summing up the author's book would really result in another book that's only marginally thinner than the original.

Stearns triess to get behind the ‘why' of the conflicts and the horrors committed, as opposed to ‘just' collecting atrocities. Which is for the better, as the few atrocities he does describe are horrid.
However, though Stearns describes the events and the causes that flow into each other very well, the one thing he does fail to do is explain why much of the conflict was so extremely violent. Perhaps that is just too much to ask.

Stearns confirms that Kagame and Museveni attended the same high school, but my earlier understanding that one of the Kabilas also attended the same school is not confirmed and seems unlikely, as Museveni introduced Laurent Kabila, the father, to Kagame, after Kagame and Museveni were looking for a Congolese leader to lend native credibility to their plan of invading the eastern DRC. Kabila, at the time, was based in Dar Es Salaam.
Earlier, Kagame, while still in the service of Museveni when trying to remove Idi Amin from power, received training in Tanzania, Cuba and the United States. Then, before making the move of trying to overthrow the government of his native country, Kagame was the head of Ugandan Military Intelligence.

Interestingly, Stearns paints the coalition's invasion of Zaire, that is, the first Congolese war, as an ideological move. Not only as a direct consequence of Rwanda's safety concerns with a resurgent government in exile just across the border hiding within the many refugee camps, but also riding on a wave of nationalist African Renaissance; South Africa just having shaken off the shackles of apartheid and several countries, Eritrea, Ethiopia as well as Rwanda, just having gotten rid of long ruling dictators.
But, as the author admits, the very big men this coalition was fighting in 1996 was exactly what it's leaders became only years later. Painfully, Kagame announcing his run for a third term on January 1 2016 only reinforces this sad development.

Stearns also points out that no real evidence exists of western conglomerates instigating any of the series of conflicts in the Congo, perhaps with the objective of obtaining access to the country's natural resources. Though opportunist, they acted reactively, were not instigators. And, as pointed out above, though eventually specifically Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe were in it for the money, initially they were not.

An interesting quote on Zaire, typical for the ramshackle autocracies of the third world: “Before the fall of Zaire, during the last years of Mobutu, the state was everywhere and oppressive but defunct and dysfunctional.”

The author published the book around the time of the previous presidential elections in the Congo. At that time, with Joseph Kabila as incumbent, he paints Kabila as being cut of the same cloth as both his father, the assassinated Laurent Kabila, and Zaire's former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, if somewhat more competent and somewhat more balanced. However, looking at his achievements now, one election cycle later, the differences seem rather smaller than greater.

Perhaps most interesting is the comparison between the conflicts in the Congo with europe's Thirty Years' war, which ran from 1618 to 1648. Then, too, many small nations were fighting each other for supremacy, with often horrible consequences for the populace. Sadly, the consequences, with the much more effective killing machines and much deeper pockets, the negative consequences, now, are much greater.

The book, rather short, is also much longer than really needed, the author repeating himself, well, repeatedly, while the quality of the maps that are to support his alternate views on where Hannibal crossed the alps are lacking. That said, it's still a thoroughly entertaining book.

A few tidbits...

Romulus was actually the grandson of Aeneas, according to roman myth the founder of Rome. Aeneas, after fleeing Troy, Ilium, having been defeated by mainland Greeks, and after spending a year in Carthage, cavorting with the legendary queen-founder of Carthage, Dido, herself having fled Tyre after her husband had been murdered by her ambitious brother, arrived in Rome to try his luck anew. (And, incidentally, this foundation story is part of the reason Romans had a love/hate relationship with Greece, Troy having been defeated by the brothers from across the Adriatic.)

The long arm of history is fascinating. After Carthage lost the first Punic war and their colonies in Sicily, a defeated Carthage saw Rome also take control of Corsica and Sardinia. Then, nursing themselves back to health, Hannibal's father Hamilcar, convinced the Carthaginian senate to move into Spain, both to be able to pay their remunerations to Rome and to rebuild their empire in preparation for revenge for the defeat Hamilcar suffered in Sicily after the Carthaginian senate told him to withdraw.
Over many years, Hamilcar effectively carved out his own personal empire in Spain, submitting the Celtic, Iberian and Celtoiberian tribes to his and Carthaginian control.
On one outing, Hamilcar and two of his sons were cut off from the main force. Hamilcar ordered his sons to take a particular route to evade capture, while he himself was going to take a more dangerous course, in the hope of diverting the enemy forces and save his sons. His sons were saved, including his oldest, Hannibal, still too young to take over from his father, but Hamilcar was killed in action.
Hamilcar's son in law took over as commander in Spain. Deploying punitive raids on the tribes responsible for the death of his father in law, Hasdrubal ended up extending control of the peninsula, submitting more tribes to his rule and increasing the family's riches.
In the process, Hasdrubal founded the capital of the dominion of the Barca family on the south coast of Spain, New Carthage, Carthago Nova, now Carthagena.
Now, when the spaniards ventured into South America some 1700 years later, one of their cities in the new world was named after Carthagena, itself named after, what was until the Romans finally defeated the Carthaginians at the end of the third Punic war, the most important power in the Mediterranean, Carthage, a city that, by the time Carthagena was founded in modern day Bolivia, had ceased to exist for more than one and a half millennia.
Salient detail, Carthago derives from the Punic for ‘new city', that is, the new Tyre, meaning that Carthagena in Colombia is like the new new new city. Or new new new rock, as ‘Tyre' derives from the Phoenician for ‘rock'.

Alexander's conquering of Asia took his men on a 10 year round trip of the Persian empire, conquering it completely in the process. Hannibal took his men across the Pyrenees and then the alps, the Romans eventually refusing to engage him at the gates of Rome itself, after devastating campaigns in northern Italy. The men that did return with him only did so after an unbelievable seventeen years.

Hannibal had soldiers from the Belearics in his army. They had slingers for weapons, also the root for the name of the group of islands. These Belearics slingers didn't demand payment in coin or gold, but in captured women.

Barcelona derives from the Punic for ‘camp of the Barcas', ‘Barca' being hannibal's family name.

Also fascinating is Hannibal's life story after almost two decades fighting in Italy, missing perhaps two opportunities of taking Rome itself, which would have completely changed the history of the world.
After Rome eventually controlled Spain, Hannibal was called back to Carthage to protect the city against a Roman attack. Eventually, Rome was able to enforce a treaty quite unfavorable to Carthage. However, Hannibal remained and even became consul for a while, introducing a number of democratizing measures in the city state.
True or not, Hannibal was then accused of again plotting against the Romans, after which he first fled to the eastern Mediterranean to offer his services in fighting Rome, there, eventually unsuccessful, continuing his objective in southern turkey. There, too, the Romans eventually defeated him, demanding his personal surrender. Instead, Hannibal chose to kill himself by taking poison, at the age of 64.

Always a fascinating story, MacLean Rogers tells it very well, though there's little in terms of new insights he brings to the table.

Time and again I'm amazed by Alexander's influence in and around modern day Afghanistan. He founded Herat, Kandahar, Bagram and Merv, all surviving as important cities to this day.
But, at least as fascinating is the distant roots of the Greek pantheon in the mountains of the Hindu Kush: According to Maclean Rogers, Prometheus was said to be bound to a rock near modern day Bagram (though Wikipedia puts this in the Caucasus), Semiramis, a legendary Syrian queen once conquered Bactria, Dionysus, who was said to have conquered India and Herakles, who also was said to have visited India.

I read about a quarter of the book, couldn't find much of it very funny, put it down, never picked it up again, decided I had better things to do with my life than to finish The Dice Man.

An entertaining sci-fi time traveling dystopian western.

I'm at a loss as to what Coetzee is really trying to get across with this almost magic realist tale. Set in, by implication, a South American country during the interwar period, the only geographic indication is the mentioning of the city of Puente Arenas, in southern Chile.

The ‘Jesus' of the title is really David, or rather, that is the name of the boy who is at the center of the story, who if judged from how he believes in himself, might have some supernatural abilities, but is mostly coddled by his adoptive mother and his guardian father.

The boy and his guardian father arrive in the new country, coming off a boat, in the style quite typical of European immigrants arriving in South America at the start of the 20th century. They arrive in a country where everyone is a newcomer and where everyone actively leaves their past behind. Though perhaps set during the waxing years of an industrial revolution, no one cares for, or believes in, capitalist, industrialist, advantages, the only actors in the book all of a very unified socialist mentality, without there being any friction with bourgeois, gentry, or any other financially affluent classes.
In fact, society, here, as described by Coetzee, is so gentile, so mellow, so reliably successful, that it made me wonder whether he's really describing some allegory for heaven, or perhaps a purposely idealistic society, to allow Coetzee to make a point.
But, if there's a point, it never becomes clear as to what it is. The very open ending of the book, effectively returning the story to where the book started, makes me unclear of Coetzee's underlying objective.

Here, perhaps,he tries to address the biggest question of all, the meaning of life. But, is so, he does it in a very circumlocutious manner, not only taking a long time to get there, but also without making a statement.

Funny enough, in an old-school sci-fi kind of way.

Very clever and a tour de force, but I couldn't be captured by the fantasy. The writing style felt forced.

The most interesting part were the epilogue, something of a fabricated justification some 1500 years after the supposed events, and an essay by the author explaining and justifying his desire to write this alternative take on Tolkien's world.

This book is about impersonal trust, basically how you as an individual put trust in the behavior of others within your society. “Will that driver stop at that stop sign?” Do you have to count the change you get back when shopping?
Trust allows for making social life more predictable, creating a sense of community and making it easier for people to work together.

The author emphasizes security as a precondition for trust. Humans, as a species, with relative extraordinary intelligence, are able to facilitate a much larger array of securities.

Schneier kicks in a bunch of open doors, hoping to convince the reader that a worldview, only based around trust and security makes perfect sense.
Somewhat, yes, but to claim that ‘the division of labor is possible because of trust' is teeth-grindingly painful to see reiterated again and again. Sure, it's sort of true, but the establishment of division of labor comes from the promise of increased efficiency (Ford did not care about trust when he created the conveyor belt, he wanted more money).

Early on, the author lists the ways in which altruism, a form of societal trust, can evolve in non-kin groups.

+ Direct reciprocity: I am nice to you because I expect you will be nice to me.
+ Indirect reciprocity: I am nice to you because that will increase my reputation, making it more likely someone else will be nice to me later.
+ Network recoprocity: being nice to you and being members of the same group sees me stay within his group where members are nice to each other.
+ Group selection: altruistic groups have a higher survival rate than non alteuistic groups.

The author pretends that in a society where everyone is honest, police and judges, locks and money would not need exist. Painful hyperbole, as that also requires everyone to have the same opinion and perfect memory. But, the author's hammer is trust, and all he sees is nails.

He takes a while to get to a list of how societal pressure reduces the risk of defection. That is, to facilitate trust.

+ Pressures that increase the actual or perceived difficulty of defecting. Hard to forge currency is an example.
+ Pressures that raise the consequences of defecting.
+ Pressures that reduce the actual or perceived benefits of defecting. Exploding ink cartridges, for example.
+ Pressures that limit the damages caused by defections of others. Insurance.
+ Pressures that increase the benefits of cooperating. Reputation managers.
+ Pressures that lower the costs of cooperating.

Another way of looking at the above list is as a collection of moral pressures, reputational pressures, institutional pressure and security systems.

The author then goes on a long, long, tour of the above, continuing with what competing interests an individual or an organization might decide between when cooperating or defecting.

The central premise of the book is mildly interesting, but the authors treatment of it contains so many kicked in open doors that the book becomes overly long and tedious.

Perhaps the book works as an American book for American audiences, where large parts of society have been dehumanized, or, where trust needs to be institutionalized because societal, social, pressures lost their meaning in a very loosely organized society.

How annoying. I'm quite sure I added my review of this book after I finished it. Yet, the review now seems to be gone.

It's been about a year, now, so my memory is a bit hazy. I thoroughly enjoyed the book. My biggest misgiving, I think, was that the double narrative was too neat; as you read the actual book, the story of the two individuals discovering each other, taking turns reading the book and taking notes, also develops, from first page to last, making both stories almost completely linear.
In reality, this would never happen, as both dip in and out of the book continuously.

Very short but excellent little travelogue of Theroux' experience sailing down Yangtze in 1981.

Easterly successfully points out that the focus of big aid agencies on providing technical solutions to abolish poverty is ineffective, as the main driver of the lack of real development is the unchecked power of the state over the poor without rights.It's an excellent point, but somewhat ramblingly delivered.With technocratic solutions, development agencies confer power and legitimacy on states that are expected to be benevolent, of their own accord. The result is what Easterly calls authoritarian development.Poverty, he continues, doesn't stem from a shortage of expertise, but a shortage of rights. The technical problems of the poor are a symptom of poverty, not a cause.Early on, Easterly points out typical fallacies used in denouncing the debate he is addressing. Typical responses aimed at quelling dissent include the following.+ You are just repeating the tired argument about free markets versus state intervention.+ You are an ideologue. Solely aimed at quelling debate, not addressing issues.+ You are attacking a straw man.Easterly points out he argues that, currently, development does not embrace the unalienable rights of the poor.The author begins with a history lesson. Comparing the views of economists Hayek and Myrdal, the former pleading for individual rights, the latter for state control overriding individual rights for the pursuit of the greater good, which, with the support of the international development community, became the modus operandi of development experts since.An important early contribution of Hayek was to recast the conventional right/left political dichotomy into a individual/collective dichotomy, which saw fascism and communism share the same side.Easterly's desire to bring up Hayek is to discuss some of the ideas discussed in Hayek's [b:The Road to Serfdom 299215 The Road to Serfdom Friedrich Hayek https://d.gr-assets.com/books/1327787673s/299215.jpg 217623] and, more specifically, to discuss the differences between Myrdal and Hayek, the former's ideas having shaped development aid for the last six decades:+ The blank slate versus learning from history in designing development solutions.+ The well being of nations versus that of the individual; making a particular set of choices and calling it ‘national development' really means making decisions on which goals will have to be sacrificed, too easily ignoring individual needs and rights.+ Conscious design versus spontaneous solutions. Here, Eaterly mentions Hayek's ideas supporting unbridled markets creating effective self regulation. (Which to me sounds like bollocks. A strong state enforces regulation, the market strives for maximum abuse of its weak.)Easterly likes to point out that the above is not a state controlled versus free market debate and that the state is required to provide certain services and whatnot, but this sounds like he at least needs to be more nuanced in his statements. And, indeed, Easterly makes the point, like Hayek, that governments need to depend on popular support to not be autocratic and serve the people they represent, a model he equates with markets being shaped by the outcome of spontaneous order in free society.And, though Easterly and Hayek are right, I believe, in that autocratic systems favor the bold, ruthless and unscrupulous, there are a small number of examples where the result is perceived to be wildly successful. Easterly addresses this later on, showing some, at least, to be based on bad data and short horizons.It is only much later that Easterly qualifies his support for a very free society. Using Adam Smith as the vehicle, he points out that the state is indeed needed to safeguard services, and that Smith's model works because of+ The division of labor+ Gains from specialization+ Gains from trade(One specific reason for the suboptimal nature of central planning is the existence of tacit knowledge, knowledge that has to be learned by doing and that can't be accessed mentally. Riding a bike is a simple example of this.)Yet, with current near ubiquitous access to information, it should not be overly surprising that centralized planning, the actual tyranny of experts, is still very appealing. It is easy to be fooled into thinking all required knowledge can simply be googled at any time.However, the appeal of technocratic, top down, development, is also very much political. It serves development experts now, it served the great powers during, but also before, the Cold War and, not in the least, it serves the autocratic governments of the countries benefiting from the influx of financial aid.The birth of international aid is often attributed to the a speech by Truman in 1949, nearly coinciding with the start of the end of western colonialism. However, thirty years prior, Woodrow Wilson made a very similar speech, praising a very similar sentiment, but at a time when institutional racism and a western disdain for those living in the underdeveloped world were still the norm. The west was ready to show the rest how it is done and, this superiority mentality has shaped international development ever since.Specifically, Easterly points to three decisions made at Versailles, that laid the ground for the long lasting preference for autocratic development aid: + The decision to create League of Nations mandates, that is, the former German colonies becoming ‘mandates' under control of the League of Nations. Through this model, these regions would be developed by outside forces to the benefit of their inhabitants.+ The decision to not endorse racial equality, proposed by Japan, shot down by the US and UK.+ The decision to transfer control of Shantung province, in China, from Germany to Japan.The above specifically had consequences for how China developed over the next 30 years.The extensive Chinese displeasure, having fought with the allies during the First World War, resulted in Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang coming to power, going on to write ‘The international Development of China', arguing for technocratic, autocratic, but Chinese, development of China.Sun Yat-Sen died a year later, Chiang Kai-shek taking on the baton and following the same path, supported by the Chinese development economist Fong who, in part to curb Japanese enterprises, favored autocratic, Chinese run, economic development.A concerted approach between the Chinese government and the American Institute of Pacific Relations, briefly interrupted by Japan's occupation of China, was only broken by the rise of Mao, who really only continued the same policies, but without outside influence and on a much more destructive level for the individual.By that time, save the occasional naysayers such as Hayek, autocratic economic development was perceived as the only desirable method for alleviating poverty in the global south.In Africa, along comparable lines, autocratic economic development began being pursued at a time when colonial powers still believed in their racial superiority. At the start of the Second World War, Britain, specifically, realizing that they needed the manpower and natural resources from their empire to stand a chance at winning the war. The smokescreen of technocratic national development, surpassing individual freedom, was gladly inherited by the first post-colonialists to further their own positions of power, continuing to stifle individual rights and freedom.Britain managed to get the US in on the arrangement, cajoling them into support on the threat of exposing the unequal treatment of blacks within US borders.It would only be after the rise of the Soviet Union in international politics that the US started supporting indigenous leaders, but without backing away from the concept of autocratic development.In one example, after the war, the US eagerly supported, through the World Bank, the autocratic development of Colombia, effectively putting and certainly keeping in power dictatorial regimes, under the guise of international development, but with the objective of keeping communism out of the Americas.And, doing this through the explicitly defined ‘apolitical' nature of the freshly created Bretton Woods institutions.(Typical for the promotion of autocratic development is the focus on promoting development while obscuring or trivialising who runs the state.)In general, autocratic systems promote collectivist behavior and an insider/outsider mentality, where members of the same group are treated with respect, but non-members can be treated badly. But, due to autocratic, collectivist societies not relying on a system of objective checks and balances, meaning that every venture is accompanied by risk that's difficult if not impossible to mitigate, historically autocratic regions are economically much less successful in the future.Studies show that democratic capital within society correlates with individualism.After dealing with Asia, Africa and Latin America, Easterly then embarks on a deeper history lesson of Europe and America. After northern Italy managed to free itself from the yoke of the Holy Roman Empire, several cities, focusing on trade and creating checks and balances on the exercise of power by nominally elected individuals, effectively creating the first instance of a society of relatively free individuals, with safeguards on their freedoms and rights, this enterprise-focused mindset was later exported to Northern Europe, where access to the Atlantic and somewhat liberal, pre-existing, societal institutions, allowed particularly England and Holland to flourish economically and individually.Similarly, African countries that suffered the most from the slave trade, groups of people being unable to trust strangers, members of their own tribe and even family, at risk of being transported to the new world, have also suffered the longest from the vicious cycle of low levels of trust facilitating insider/outsider behavior as well as autocratic governance, inhibiting progress for hundreds of years.(Related, oppression is a crime of opportunity. If you can do it, and you can get away with it, you will do it.)Free, inclusive societies, are much better equipped for pretty much every challenge. Because individuals within society can and will push society to a position that better benefits more people. Whether in business, through risk taking under mostly predictable circumstances, or in science.Easterly goes on to suggest much freer immigration rules, making the point that someone emigrating from, say, Zambia and going to work in, say, the US, increases the GDP of the world and will have a positive net effect on his own life and the lives of those that stayed behind. And, indeed, disallowing migration from poor countries enforces poverty in those countries.But, strangely, Easterly also brings up the Mourides (the informal global financial and trade network) as a success story of migration, which effectively is a closed elitist group, similar to the Maghribis he riles against earlier.Then, Easterly points out that strong economic growth has been shown to not be tied to government policies. (Late in the book, easterly makes a strong if obvious, case for why the tyranny of experts is a terrible system for development. These experts and their solutions neither face a market test nor a democratic test.)The second half of the book becomes more and more verbose and, almost tedious, Easterly going on multiple tangents. But, many of the points Easterly makes are sound, if long winded.Larger, more connected populations, are more prone to innovation. Therefore, introducing ‘best practices' in development as a top down approach actually goes counter to what probably is the best strategy. That is, to let people, the market, decide.(An interesting consequence of larger populations developing faster is that technologies available to individual communities in the year 1500 is a strong indicator for their level of development today.)It's in the last chapter that Easterly puts it all together, thoroughly debunking the myth of the benefit of the enlightened despot. Even in the few cases where temporary high growth happened under dictators, the growth happened likely not because of them, but in spite of them. This, combined with typically taking a very short term view of history as well as statistical fallacies and incorrect measurements and assessments, the myth of the benevolent despot fizzles out quickly.

Entertaining and interesting for its focus on societal connections in a dystopian world.
But, Theroux draws the story out for too long, while not spending nearly enough time making plausible how society developed into what Theroux envisions it to be.

Reich wrote for Americans about America, in 2012, specifically in the hope of getting Obama on a more progressive course in his second term.
Interestingly, a lot of the points he raises have been taken up, now, by Bernie Sanders.

Reich is pleasantly compact and analytic. He starts off by giving the big picture:
For three decades, almost all gains from economic growth have gone to the top adding to that, that the 2008 recession was followed by only marginally a recovery. In addition, political power has been flowing to the top as well, resulting in corporations and the very rich paying lower taxes and receiving more corporate welfare, being bound by fewer regulations. As a result, government budgets are squeezed and average Americans end up competing with each other for slices of a shrinking pie, resulting in meaner and more cynical politics.

A few points to ponder:

+ In the last 50 years or so, wealthy Americans went from financing the U.S. Government (through taxes) to lending it money.

+ Philanthropy of the upper class, now, has strong parallels with the same in the late 19th century, when the poverty gap was also huge.

+ With the abuse, by the rich, of the political and judicial systems, the common people will also start to operate in grey and black markets, thinking that if the big guys cheat in big ways, they might as well begin cheating in small ways. This, of course was at the root of the Soviet collapse, where the state no longer had a control over the economy.

Reich also points out how the upper class hegemony can be broken. The people themselves need to make politicians do what's best for the country.
Indeed, this is not an easy fix, but democracy doesn't have to be easy.

Not as great as his later work, but, excellent.

“To people who do not operate under statute, legal process is simply one instrument among many.”

Perhaps Dick's most lucid book.

“The trouble with being educated is that it takes a long time; it uses up the better part of your life and when you are finished what you know is that you would have benefited more by going into banking.”

Jochen Peiper was for several years Himmler's charge de affairs. As a prominent member of the SS, he also lead several battles on the Soviet front and was involved in what later came to be seen as war crimes in both Italy and Belgium.

The book is the product of some ten years of research, but would have benefited from some heavy editing. Particularly the first half, detailing Peiper's life up to the end of the Second World War, is just tedious. The post war narrative, if also way too long, is more interesting. Not so much for Peiper's life story, but for the descriptions of how postwar Germany dealt with its own history.
Germany did not have a truth and reconciliation commission, though plenty of politicians, both in and outside Germany, walked a fine line of appeasing all parties, exactly to be able to not obfuscate the truth while avoiding excessive prosecution of those having been seen to have committed war crimes.
Of course, the biggest driving force of the Nuremberg trials, and several like it, the USA, discovered themselves how fluid morality in war actually is from the fifties onwards. First in Korea, then in Vietnam.

Excellent, almost psychedelic, work.

Therapy for getting over the author's psychosis. Surprisingly gripping.

A intensely powerful portrait of a small but diverse number of Afghans living through the horrors, first of the Mujahideen, then the Taliban, then the American occupation and the Taliban insurgency the Americans unwittingly, but foolishly, engendered.

Includes an interesting description of Hamid Karzai's failed CIA-backed attempt at overthrowing the Taliban, shortly after the American invasion, which did lead to him gaining revolutionary credit and, initially, being offered the vice presidency, before elections.

Goes to some length to describe the royal fuckups of the Americans on the ground, in the need of capturing anyone to prove their own effectively, allowing favored factions to single out personal enemies as ‘Taliban', the ensuing anger and grief creating the opposition that wasn't there to begin with.
Also details the extensive use and condoning of torture by the Americans.

Notwithstanding the horrors, the book also made me realize how intensely I miss central and east Asia.

Ancient, published in 1992, but still interesting if not entertaining, even if much of its contents has now been rehashed in later works, though still poignantly relevant for our extensive modern online discourse, where reason is often not the primary concern.

Sutherland spends roughly half the book explaining the different types of irrationality and then uses the remainder to highlight how these work in practice.

Judging by the first thing that comes to mind is called the availability error.
Related are the halo and devil effect, if a person has one salient good, or bad, trait, it overshadows, coloring the person's other properties.
Being more influenced by early than by late items in a list is called the primacy error.

The habit of obedience is so ingrained that people can act out of obedience without even knowing that they are doing so. And that's on top of what happens when obeying is central to your position, like in the military, or only has consequences for outsiders, like when you are not directly confronted with the results of your actions.
Related, but different, is conformity, behaving in the same way as one's peers. Connected to this is the boomerang effect, where people become more convinced that they are right when their (public) beliefs are challenged. In other words, it's near-impossible to convince someone he's wrong.

Conformity to crowds can lead to panic and violence. And religious conversion.

Within groups, opinions tend to shift beyond the typical, average, opinion of the individuals. Liberals, in a group, tend to become more liberal, conservatives more conservative. Essentially, this is groupthink.
This means that committees, subgroups of in-groups tend to be more extreme than the group from which they are drawn.
One consequence of the in-group/out-group dichotomy is that competitive sports, even as friendly matches, more typically foster animosity as opposed to friendship. To alleviate this, nembers of different groups can cooperate to work towards a common goal, though this only is shown to bring people together when the goal is achieved. Otherwise, prejudice is maintained.

As a consequence, organizations, particularly public ones, tend to make irrational decisions. Opening up the decision process to the public can alleviate this to some extent.

Misplaced consistency is when people hold on to initial decisions for the sake of not being seen to backtrack, whether publicly or not. It's why people tend to not cut their losses. Hence the ‘sunk cost error'.

Tests show that rewards devalue any activity considered worth doing in its own right. The activity in question will be valued less after the rewards no longer are handed out.
As a consequence, a carrot for promoting good behavior does not facilitate institutional change.
The exception is ‘praise', non-monetary rewards, which can be seen as a form of reward, but typically has a positive influence on the future completion of tasks.
In the obverse, mild threats produce stronger results than strong threats.
Related, large rewards, strong motivation, but also stress, foster inflexibility when attempting to solve a problem.

When a particular belief is involved, we tend to go to extreme lengths to look for supporting evidence while refusing to believe contrary evidence. If that fails, we distort existing evidence.
Specifically, evidence favoring a belief strengthens it, while if the same evidence disproves a belief, it is ignored.
A very surprising consequence is that we seek confirmation of our own opinions of ourselves, even when they are derogatory.

Drawing causal conclusions from unrelated events is called illusory correlation. This is typically reinforced by what the person expects in the first place, being blind to non-matching results and having an eye for comparative, but possibly meaningless, outliers. And statistics, though essential for, for example, diagnosis, is a bitch.
We tend to feel there's an increased likelihood of something implausible happening when that is paired with something very plausible, even though that should decrease the chances of it happening.
Of similar difficulty is the ability to identify cause and effect. What's more, the more prominent an effect, from the same action, the more we hold the agent responsible.

With hindsight on our side, we become overconfident in our ability to predict future outcomes of events.

Risk assessment is difficult for specialists and engineers, but nearly impossible for the general public: misunderstandings, fear of the unknown, untested technologies, overconfidence, etc, all result in the less specialized relying on a, typically, very bad, gut feeling, typically underestimating risk in general or associating irrelevant imagery with the risk involved (like, for example, nuclear energy).

Sutherland also discusses utility theory, basically a statistical method to not only include expected outcomes, but including the usefulness of these outcomes.
The related cost/benefit analysis, though having its own place, is limited by it only addressing financial gains and losses.
In medicine, a similar technique is QALY, the quality-adjusted life year.

The book is full of conclusions that are fairly obvious to skeptics and represent hard to convey truths in practice. For one, there's a large gap between what people think they do and what they in fact do. This may sound obvious, but in practice it will mean you hit a brick wall when pointing this out in the real world: in one study, 77% of subjects were shown to not read the warning labels on dangerous consumer products, while 97% claimed to do so, when interviewed.

At the end, Sutherland attempts to list underlying causes for irrationality:

+ Evolution, where our ancestors typically had to make many crucial decisions under duress.
+ The analog, imperfect, nature of the brain favors generalizations.
+ Our implicit desire to take mental shortcuts in deducing conclusions.
+ Our general incapacity to apply basic statistics.
+ The self serving bias.

Reads like a novel for teenage girls. At least until a quarter in. Then I gave up. It was horrible.